Hard Provability Logics by Mojtahedi, Mojtaba
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
04
28
4v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  1
1 N
ov
 20
19
Hard Provability Logics
Mojtaba Mojtahedi∗
Department of Mathematics, Statistics and Computer Science,
College of Sciences, University of Tehran
November 12, 2019
Dedicated to Mohammad Ardeshir, for 17 years of his impact, inspirations and motivations.
Abstract
Let PL(T,T′) and PLΣ1 (T,T
′) respectively indicates the provability logic and Σ1-provability
logic of T relative in T′. In this paper we characterize the following relative provability logics:
PLΣ1
(HA,N), PLΣ1 (HA,PA), PLΣ1 (HA
∗
,N), PLΣ1 (HA
∗
,PA), PL(PA,HA), PLΣ1 (PA,HA),
PL(PA∗,HA), PLΣ1 (PA
∗
,HA), PL(PA∗,PA), PLΣ1 (PA
∗
,PA), PL(PA∗,N), PLΣ1 (PA
∗
,N) (see
Table 6). It turns out that all of these provability logics are decidable.
The notion of reduction for provability logics, first informally considered in [AM15]. In
this paper, we formalize a generalization of this notion (Definition 4.1) and provide several
reductions of provability logics (See diagram 7). The interesting fact is that PLΣ1 (HA,N) is
the hardest provability logic: the arithmetical completenesses of all provability logics listed
above, as well as well-known provability logics like PL(PA,PA), PL(PA,N), PLΣ1 (PA,PA),
PLΣ1
(PA,N) and PLΣ1 (HA,HA) are all propositionally reducible to the arithmetical complete-
ness of PLΣ1 (HA,N).
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1 Dedication
My works in general and the present paper in particular are highly inspired by Mohammad Ardeshirs
outstanding contributions to mathematical logic. The ideas that I developed in this paper originate
from a joint paper [AM15] which was initially motivated by him. My first recollection of Mohammad
Ardeshir goes back to 2003 when, in the second semester of my undergraduate studies, I attended
his course on the foundations of mathematics. I was impressed by his knowledge and by the style
of his teaching which encouraged me to attend most of his other courses during my undergraduate
and graduate studies. I still vividly remember how deeply I was fascinated by his graduate course
on Gdels incompleteness theorems in Fall 2006. It was this course which made me determinate to
do my PhD on mathematical logic and under the supervision of Mohammad Ardeshir. His influence
on me is not restricted to my academic work. He has been a source of inspiration on many aspects
of my life; and that is why dedicating this paper to him is the least thing I can do to thank him.
2 Introduction
There are two excellent surveys on provability logic: [BV06, AB04]. To be self-contained, we bring
some selected subjects from them here, and then review some related recent results on this subject.
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The provability interpretation for the modal operator ✷, first considered by Kurt Go¨del [Go¨d33],
intending to provide a semantic for Heyting’s formalization of the intuitionistic logic, IPC. On the
other hand, and again by innovative and celebrated Go¨del’s incompleteness results [Go¨d31], for a
recursively enumerable theory T and a sentence in the language of T, one may formalize “A is
provable in T” via a simple (Σ1) formula ProvT (pAq) in the first-order language of arithmetic, in
which pAq is the Go¨del number of A. Let PL(T,T′) and PL
Σ1
(T,T′) respectively indicates the
provability logic and Σ1-provability logic of T relative in T
′ (Definition 3.2). Here is a list of results
on provability logics with arithmetical flavour:
1. ¬✷⊥ 6∈ PL(PA,PA), [Go¨d31]
2. ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A ∈ PL(PA,PA), [L5¨5]
3. A ∈ PL(HA,HA) for a nonmodal proposition A, iff A is valid in the intuitionistic logic IPC.
[dJ70, dJVV11]
4. GL = PL(PA,PA) and GLS = PL(PA,N) = PL(PA,ZF), [Sol76], in which GL is the Go¨del-Lo¨b
logic, as defined in Definition 3.4.
5. ✷(A ∨B)→ (✷A ∨ ✷B) 6∈ PL(HA,HA), [Myh73, Fri75]
6. ✷(A ∨B)→ ✷(✷. A ∨ ✷. B) ∈ PL(HA,HA), in which ✷. A is a shorthand for A ∧ ✷A, [Lei75]
7. iGLCT = PL(PA∗,PA∗), [Vis81, Vis82], in which iGLCT is as defined in Definition 3.4,
8. ✷¬¬✷A → ✷✷A ∈ PL(HA,HA) and ✷(¬¬✷A → ✷A) → ✷(✷A ∨ ¬✷A) ∈ PL(HA,HA),
[Vis81, Vis82]
9. Rosalie Iemhoff 2001 introduced a uniform axiomatization of all known axiom schemas of
PL(HA,HA) in an extended language with a bimodal operator ✄. In her Ph.D. dissertation
[Iem01], Iemhoff raised a conjecture that implies directly that her axiom system, iPH, restricted
to the normal modal language, is equal to PL(HA,HA), [Iem01]
10. PL{⊤,⊥}(HA,HA) is decidable. [Vis02]. In other words, he introduced a decision algorithm for
A ∈ PL(HA,HA), for all A not containing any atomic variable.
11. PL
Σ1
(HA,HA) = iHσ (Definition 3.28) is decidable, [AM18, VZ19]
12. PLΣ1 (HA
∗,HA∗) = iH∗σ (Definition 3.28) is decidable, [AM19]
As it is known in the literature [TvD88], the Heyting Arithmetic HA, enjoys disjunction property:
if HA ⊢ A ∨ B, then either HA ⊢ A or HA ⊢ B. Regrettably, HA is not able to prove this [Fri75,
Myh73]. Hence, such properties, are not reflected in the provability logic of HA, as a valid principle
✷(A ∨B)→ (✷A ∨ ✷B). A natural question arises here: is there any other valid rule?
One way to systematically answer this question, is to characterise the truth provability logic of
HA. In the case of classical arithmetic PA, Robert Solovay in his original innovative paper [Sol76],
characterized the truth provability logic of PA. He showed that the only extra valid axiom is the
soundness principle ✷A → A, which is known to be true and unprovable in PA. In this paper we
show that, in the Σ1-provablity logic of HA, the same thing happens: The truth Σ1-provability logic
of HA, is a decidable and only has the extra axiom schema ✷A → A. The disjunction property,
which we mentioned before, will be deuced from Leivant’s principle ✷(A ∨B)→ ✷(✷A ∨ ✷B) and
the soundness principle.
The author of this paper in his joint paper with Mohammad Ardeshir [AM15], showed that the
arithmetical completeness of the modal logic GL, is reducible to the arithmetical completeness of
GL + p → ✷p for Σ1 interpretations. The reduction involves only propositional argument. In this
paper, we show that all relative provability logics, discussed in this paper, are reducible to the truth
Σ1-provability logic of HA (see Diagram 7). So, in a sense, PLΣ1 (HA,N) is the hardest among them.
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With the handful propositional reductions, we will characterize several relative provability logics
for HA, PA, HA∗ and PA∗, the self-completion of HA and PA [Vis82].
3 Definitions and Preliminaries
The propositional non-modal languageL0 contains atomic variables, ∨,∧,→,⊥ and the propositional
modal language, L✷ has an additional operator ✷. In this paper, the atomic propositions (in the
modal or non-modal language) include atomic variables and ⊥. For an arbitrary proposition A,
Sub(A) is defined to be the set of all sub-formulae of A, including A itself. We take Sub(X) :=⋃
A∈X Sub(A) for a set of propositions X . We use ✷
. A as a shorthand for A ∧✷A. The logic IPC is
intuitionistic propositional non-modal logic over the usual propositional non-modal language. The
theory IPC✷ is the same theory IPC in the extended language of the propositional modal language,
i.e. its language is the propositional modal language and its axioms and rules are same as IPC .
Because we have no axioms for ✷ in IPC✷, it is obvious that ✷A for each A, behaves exactly like
an atomic variable inside IPC✷. First-order intuitionistic logic is denoted IQC and the logic CQC is
its classical closure, i.e. IQC plus the principle of excluded middle. For a set of sentences and rules
Γ ∪ {A} in the propositional non-modal, propositional modal or first-order language, Γ ⊢ A means
that A is derivable from Γ in the system IPC, IPC✷, IQC, respectively. For an arithmetical formula,
pAq represents the Go¨del number of A. For an arbitrary arithmetical theory T with a ∆0(exp)-set
of axioms, as far as we work in strong enough theories which is the case in this paper, we have the
∆0(exp)-predicate ProofT (x, pAq), that is a formalization of “x is the code of a proof for A in T ”.
Note that by (inspection of the proof of) Craig’s theorem, every recursively enumerable theory has
a ∆0(exp)-axiomatization. We also have the provability predicate ProvT (pAq) := ∃x ProofT (x, pAq).
The set of natural numbers is denoted by ω := {0, 1, 2, . . .}.
Definition 3.1. Suppose T is a ∆0(exp)-axiomatized theory and σ is a substitution i.e. a function
from atomic variables to arithmetical sentences. We define the interpretation σ
T
which extend the
substitution σ to all modal propositions A, inductively:
• σ
T
(A) := σ(A) for atomic A,
• σ
T
distributes over ∧,∨,→,
• σ
T
(✷A) := ProvT (pσT(A)q).
We call σ a Γ-substitution (in some theory T), if for every atomic A, σ(A) ∈ Γ (T ⊢ σ(A)↔ A′ for
some A′ ∈ Γ). We also say that σ
T
is a Γ-interpretation if σ is a Γ-substitution.
Definition 3.2. The relative provability logic of T in some sufficiently strong theory U restricted
to a set of first-order sentences Γ, is defined to be a modal propositional theory PL
Γ
(T,U) such
that PL
Γ
(T,U) ⊢ A iff for all arithmetical substitutions σ in Γ, we have U ⊢ σ
T
(A). We make
this convention: PLΓ(T,N) indicates PLΓ(T,Theory(N)), in which Theory(N) is the set of all true
sentences in the standard model of arithmetic.
Define NOI (No Outside Implication) as the set of modal propositions A, such that any occurrence
of → is in the scope of some ✷. To be able to state an extension of Leivant’s Principle (that is
adequate to axiomatize Σ1-provability logic of HA) we need a translation on the modal language
which we call Leivant’s translation. We define it recursively as follows:
• Al := A for atomic or boxed A,
• (A ∧B)l := Al ∧Bl,
• (A ∨B)l := ✷. Al ∨ ✷. Bl,
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• (A→ B)l is defined by cases: If A ∈ NOI, we define (A→ B)l := A→ Bl, otherwise we define
(A→ B)l := A→ B.
Let us define the box translation (.)✷ and some variants of it:
• A✷↑ := A✷ := ✷. A and A✷↓ := A for atomic A or A := ⊤,⊥,
• (✷A)✷↑ := ✷A and (✷A)✷ := (✷A)✷↓ := ✷A✷,
• (.)✷↑, (.)✷ and (.)✷↓ commute with ∧ and ∨,
• (B → C)✷↑ := ✷. (B✷↑ → C✷↑), (B → C)✷ := ✷. (B✷ → C✷) and (B → C)✷↓ := B✷↓ → C✷↓.
Remark 3.3. For every A we have A✷ = (A✷↓)✷↑. Also iK4 ⊢ A✷ ↔ (A✷↑)✷↓.
Proof. Both statements are proved easily by induction on the complexity of A, and we leave them
to the reader. ✷
Definition 3.4. Let us first we list some axiom schemas:
• i := A, for every theorem A of IPC✷,
• K := ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B),
• 4 := ✷A→ ✷✷A,
• Lob := L := ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A,
• The Completeness Principle: CP := C := A→ ✷A.
• Restriction of Completeness Principle to atomic variables: CPa := Ca := p → ✷p, for atomic
p.
• The reflection principle: S := ✷A→ A.
• The complete reflection principle: S∗ := ✷A→ A✷.
• The Principle of Excluded Middle: PEM := P := A ∨ ¬A.
• Leivant’s Principle: Le := ✷(B ∨ C)→ ✷(✷B ∨C). [Lei75]
• Extended Leivant’s Principle: Le+ := ✷A→ ✷Al. [AM18]
• Trace Principle: TP := ✷(A→ B)→ (A ∨ (A→ B)). [Vis82]
• For an axiom schema A, the axiom schema A indicates the box of every axiom instance of A.
Also A indicates A ∧ A.
All modal systems which will be defined here, only has one inference rule: modus ponens
B B → A
A
. Also the celebrated modal logics, like K4, which has the necessitation rule of
inference,
A
✷A
, by abuse of notation, are considered here with the same name and with the same
set of theorems, however without the necessitation rule. The reason for this alternate definition of
systems, is quite technical. Of course one may define them with the necessitation rule, but at the
cost of loosing the uniformity of definitions. So in the rest of this paper, all modal systems, are
considered with the modus ponens rule of inference.
Consider a list A1, . . . ,An of axiom schemas. The notation A1A2 . . .An will be used in this paper
for a modal system containing all axiom instance of all axiom schemas Ai, and is closed under modus
ponens. This genral notation makes things uniform and easy to remember for later usage. However,
we make the following exceptions:
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• GL := iGLP,
• GLS := GL plus S. We may define similarly GLSCa and GLCa.
We also gathered the list of axioms and theories in Tables 5 and 6.
Lemma 3.5. For every modal proposition A, we have iK4 ⊢ A✷ ↔ ✷. A✷.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A. ✷
Lemma 3.6. For every modal proposition A, we have iK4+ ✷. CP ⊢ A↔ A✷ and iK4+✷CP ⊢ A↔
A✷↓.
Proof. Note that the first assertion implies the second one. To prove the equivalence of A and A✷
in iK4+ ✷. CP, one must use induction on the complexity of A. All cases are simple and left to the
reader. ✷
Lemma 3.7. For every modal proposition A, we have iGL ⊢ A implies iGL ⊢ A✷↑ ∧ A✷↓ ∧ A✷. The
same holds for iGLCa.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of proof iGL ⊢ A. ✷
Lemma 3.8. Let A be some proposition and E ∈ sub(A✷). Then iK4+ CPa ⊢ E✷↑ → ✷. E.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of E. All cases are trivial except for E = F✷ → G✷. In this
case we have E✷↑ = ✷. ((F✷)✷↑ → (G✷)✷↑). One may observe that (A✷)✷↑ ↔ A✷ is valid in iK4 and
hence we have iK4 ⊢ E✷↑ ↔ ✷. E. ✷
3.1 Preliminaries from Arithmetic
The first-order language of arithmetic contains three functions (successor, addition and multiplica-
tion), one predicate symbol and a constant: (S,+, · ,≤, 0). First-order intuitionistic arithmetic (HA)
is the theory over IQC with the axioms:
Q1 Sx 6= 0,
Q2 Sx = S(y)→ x = y,
Q3 x+ 0 = x,
Q4 x+ Sy = S(x+ y),
Q5 x.0 = 0,
Q6 x.Sy = (x.y) + x,
Q7 x ≤ y ↔ ∃z z + x = y,
Ind: For each formula A(x):
Ind(A, x) := UC[(A(0) ∧ ∀x(A(x)→ A(Sx)))→ ∀xA(x)]
In which UC(B) is the universal closure of B.
Peano Arithmetic PA, has the same axioms of HAover CQC.
Notation 3.9. From now on, when we are working in the first-order language of arithmetic, for a
first-order sentence A, the notations ✷A and ✷+A are shorthand for ProvHA (pAq) and ProvPA (pAq),
respectively. Let iΣ1 be the theory HA, where the induction principle is restricted to Σ1-formulae.
We also define HAx to be the theory with axioms of HA, in which the induction principle is restricted
to formulae satisfying at least one of the following conditions:
6
• Σ1-formulas,
• formulae with Go¨del number less than x.
We define PAx similarly. Also define ✷xA and ✷
+
xA to be provability predicates in HAx and PAx ,
respectively.
Lemma 3.10. For every formula A, we have PA ⊢ ∀x ✷+(✷+xA→ A) and HA ⊢ ∀x ✷(✷xA→ A).
Proof. The case of PA is well known [HP93]. For the case HA, see [Smo73] or [Vis02, Theorem
8.1]. ✷
Lemma 3.11. HA proves all true Σ1 sentences. Moreover this argument is formalizable and provable
in HA, i.e. for every Σ1-formula A(x1, . . . , xk) we have HA ⊢ A(x1, . . . , xk)→ ✷A(x˙1, . . . , x˙k).
Proof. It is a well-known fact that any true (in the standard model N) Σ1-sentence is provable in
HA [Vis02]. Moreover this argument is constructive and formalizable in HA. ✷
Lemma 3.12. For any ∆0(exp)-formula A(x¯), we have HA ⊢ ∀x¯(A(x¯) ∨ ¬A(x¯)).
Proof. This is well-known in the literature [TvD88]. ✷
Lemma 3.13. Let A, B be Σ1-formulae such that PA ⊢ A→ B. Then HA ⊢ A→ B.
Proof. Observe that every implication of Σ1-sentences in HA is equivalent to a Π2 sentence and use
the Π2-conservativity of PA over HA [TvD88](3.3.4). ✷
Definition 3.14. For a first-order theory T and first-order arithmetical formula A, the Beeson-
Visser translation AT is defined as follows:
• AT := A for atomic A,
• (.)T commutes with ∧,∨ and ∃,
• (A→ B)T := (AT → BT) ∧ ProvT (pAT → BTq)
• (∀xA)T := ∀xAT ∧ ProvT (p∀xATq).
HA∗ and PA∗ were first introduced in [Vis82]. These theories are defined as
HA∗ := {A | HA ⊢ AHA} and PA∗ := {A | PA ⊢ APA}.
Visser in [Vis82] showed that the (Σ1-)provability logic of PA
∗ is iGLCT, i.e. iGLCT ⊢ A iff for
all arithmetical substitution σ, PA∗ ⊢ σPA∗ (A). That means that
PL(PA∗) = PL
Σ1
(PA∗) = iGLCT.
Lemma 3.15. For any arithmetical Σ1-formula A
1. HA ⊢ A↔ AHA,
2. HA ⊢ A↔ APA.
Proof. See [Vis82, 4.6.iii]. ✷
Lemma 3.16. For every arithmetical sentence A we have
• HA ⊢ ProvHA (pAq)→ ProvHA∗ (pAq),
• HA∗ ⊢ A→ ProvHA (pAq),
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• PA∗ ⊢ A→ ProvPA (pAq).
Proof. For the first item, consider some A such that HA ⊢ A. By induction on the proof of A in HA,
one may prove that HA ⊢ AHA. Moreover this argument is formalizable and provable in HA. We
refer the reader to [Vis82] for details.
For the proof of second and third items, one may use induction on the complexity of A, and we leave
the routine induction to the reader. ✷
Lemma 3.17. For any Σ1-substitution σ and each propositional modal sentence A, we have HA ⊢
(σHA∗ (A))HA ↔ σ
PA∗
(()A✷↑) and PA ⊢ (σ
PA∗
(A))PA ↔ σ
PA∗
(A✷↑).
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A. All cases are easily derived by Lemma 3.15. ✷
Lemma 3.18. For any Σ1-substitution σ and each propositional modal sentence A, we have HA ⊢
σHA (A✷)↔ (σHA∗ (A))HA and HA ⊢ σPA (A✷)↔ (σPA∗ (A))PA.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A. All cases are easily derived by Lemma 3.15. ✷
Lemma 3.19. For any Σ1-substitution σ and each propositional modal sentence A, we have HA ⊢
σHA (A✷↓)↔ σHA∗ (A) and HA ⊢ σPA(A
✷↓)↔ σ
PA∗
(A).
Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A. All cases are easy, except for boxed case, which
holds by Lemma 3.18. ✷
Lemma 3.20. For any Σ1-substitution σ and each propositional modal sentence A, we have HA ⊢
σPA (A✷↓)↔ σPA∗ (A).
Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A. All cases are easy, except for boxed case, which
holds by Lemma 3.18. ✷
3.1.1 Kripke models of HA
A first-order Kripke model for the language of arithmetic is a triple K = (K,4,M) such that:
• The frame of K, i.e. (K,≺), is a non-empty partially ordered set,
• M is a function fromK to the first-order classical structures for the language of the arithmetic,
i.e. M(α) is a first-order classical structure, for each α ∈ K,
• For any α 4 β ∈ K, M(α) is a weak substructure of M(β).
For any α ∈ K and first-order formula A ∈ Lα (the language of arithmetic augmented with constant
symbols a¯ for each a ∈ |M(α)|), we define K, α  A (or simply α  A, if no confusion is likely)
inductively as follows:
• For atomic A, K, α  A iff M(α) |= A. Note that in the structure M(α), a¯ is interpreted as a,
• K, α  A ∨B iff K, α  A or K, α  B,
• K, α  A ∧B iff K, α  A and K, α  B,
• K, α  A→ B iff for all β < α, K, β  A implies K, β  B,
• K, α  ∃xA iff K, α  A[x : a¯], for some a ∈ |M(α)|,
• K, α  ∀xA iff for all β < α and b ∈ |M(β)|, we have K, β  A[x : b¯].
It is well-known in the literature [TvD88] that HA is complete for first-order Kripke models.
Lemma 3.21. Let K = (K,4,M) be a Kripke model of HA and A be an arbitrary Σ1-formula.
Then for each α ∈ K, we have α  A iff M(α) |= A.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A to show that for each α ∈ K, we have α  A iff
M(α) |= A. In the inductive step for → and ∀, use Lemma 3.12. ✷
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3.1.2 Interpretability
Let T and S be two first-order theories. Informally speaking, we say that T interprets S (T ✄ S)
if there exists a translation from the language of S to the language of T such that T proves the
translation of all of the theorems of S. For a formal definition see [Vis98]. It is well-known that for
recursive theories T and S containing PA, the assertion T ✄S is formalizable in first-order language
of arithmetic. For two arithmetical sentences A and B, we use the notation A ✄ B to mean that
PA+A interprets PA+B. The following theorem due to Orey, first appeared in [Fef60].
Theorem 3.22. For recursive theories T and S containing PA, we have:
PA ⊢ (T ✄ S)↔ ∀x✷TCon(S
x),
in which Sx is the restriction of the theory S to axioms with Go¨del number ≤ x and Con(U) :=
¬✷U⊥.
Proof. See [Fef60]. p.80 or [Ber90]. ✷
Convention. From Theorem 3.22, one can easily observe that PA ⊢ (A✄B)↔ ∀x✷+(A→ ¬✷+x ¬B).
So from now on, A ✄ B means its Π2-equivalent ∀x✷+(A → ¬✷+x ¬B), even when we are working
in weaker theories like HA, for which the above theorem (Theorem 3.22) doesn’t hold. We remind
the reader that ✷+ stands for provability in PA.
3.1.3 Somry´nski’s method for Constructing Kripke models of HA
With the general method of constructing Kripke models for HA, invented by Smoryn´ski [Smo73],
interpretability of theories containing PA plays an important role in constructing Kripke models
of HA.
Definition 3.23. A triple I := (K,4, T ) is called an I-frame iff it has the following properties:
• (K,4) is a finite tree,
• T is a function from K to arithmetical r.e. consistent theories containing PA,
• if β 4 γ, then Tβ interprets Tγ (Tβ ✄ Tγ ).
Theorem 3.24. For every I-frame I := (K,4, T ) there exists a first-order Kripke model K =
(K,4,M) such that K  HA and moreover M(α) |= Tα, for any α ∈ K. Note that both of the
I-frame and Kripke model are sharing the same frame (K,4).
Proof. See [Smo73, page 372-7]. For more detailed proof of a generalization of this theorem, see
[AM14, Theorem 4.8]. ✷
3.2 The NNIL formulae and related topics
The class of No Nested Implications to the Left, NNIL formulae in a propositional language was
introduced in [VvBdJRdL95], and more explored in [Vis02]. The crucial result of [Vis02] is providing
an algorithm that as input, gives a non-modal proposition A and returns its best NNIL approximation
A∗ from below, i.e., IPC ⊢ A∗ → A and for all NNIL formulae B such that IPC ⊢ B → A, we have
IPC ⊢ B → A∗. Also for all Σ1-substitutions σ, we have HA ⊢ σHA(✷A↔ ✷A
∗) [Vis02].
The precise definition of the class NNIL of modal propositions is NNIL := {A | ρA ≤ 1}, in which
the complexity measure ρ, is defined inductively as follows:
• ρ(✷A) = ρ(p) = ρ(⊥) = ρ(⊤) = 0, for an arbitrary atomic variables p and modal proposition A,
• ρ(A ∧B) = ρ(A ∨B) = max(ρA, ρB),
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• ρ(A→ B) = max(ρA+ 1, ρB),
Definition 3.25. For any two modal propositions A and B, we define [A]B by induction on the
complexity of B:
• [A]B = B, for atomic or boxed B,
• [A](B1 ◦B2) = [A](B1) ◦ [A](B2) for ◦ ∈ {∨,∧},
• [A](B1 → B2) = A′ → (B1 → B2), in which A′ = A[B1 → B2 | B2], i.e., replace each outer
occurrence of B1 → B2 (by outer occurrence we mean that it is not in the scope of any ✷) in
A by B2,
For a set X of modal propositions, we also define [A]X :=
∨
B∈X [A]B.
The NNIL-algorithm
For each modal proposition A, the proposition A∗ is defined inductively as follows [Vis02]:
1. A is atomic or boxed, take A∗ := A.
2. A = B ∧ C, take A∗ := B∗ ∧ C∗.
3. A = B ∨ C, take A∗ := B∗ ∨ C∗.
4. A = B → C, we have several sub-cases. In the following, an occurrence of E in D is called
an outer occurrence, if E is neither in the scope of an implication nor in the scope of a boxed
formula.
(a) C contains an outer occurrence of a conjunction. In this case, there is some formula J(q)
such that
• q is a propositional variable not occurring in A.
• q is outer in J and occurs exactly once.
• C = J [q|(D ∧ E)].
Now set C1 := J [q|D], C2 := J [q|E] and A1 := B → C1, A2 := B → C2 and finally, define
A∗ := A∗1 ∧ A
∗
2.
(b) B contains an outer occurrence of a disjunction. In this case, there is some formula J(q)
such that
• q is a propositional variable not occurring in A.
• q is outer in J and occurs exactly once.
• B = J [q|(D ∨ E)].
Now set B1 := J [q|D], B2 := J [q|E] and A1 := B1 → C,A2 := B2 → C and finally, define
A∗ := A∗1 ∧ A
∗
2.
(c) B =
∧
X and C =
∨
Y and X,Y are sets of implications, atomics or boxed formulas. We
have several sub-cases:
i. X contains an atomic variable or a boxed formula E. We set D :=
∧
(X \ {E}) and
take A∗ := E∗ → (D → C)∗.
ii. X contains ⊤. Define D :=
∧
(X \ {⊤}) and take A∗ := (D → C)∗.
iii. X contains ⊥. Take A∗ := ⊤.
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iv. X contains only implications. For any D = E → F ∈ X , define
B ↓D :=
∧
((X \ {D}) ∪ {F}).
Let Z := {E | E → F ∈ X} ∪ {C} and define:
A∗ :=
∧
{((B ↓D)→ C)∗|D ∈ X} ∧
∨
{([B]E)∗ | E ∈ Z}
Lemma 3.26. If IPC✷ ⊢ A→ B then IPC✷ ⊢ A∗ → B∗.
Proof. See [AM18, Theorem. 4.5]. ✷
The TNNIL-algorithm
Definition 3.27. TNNIL (Thoroughly NNIL) is the smallest class of propositions such that
• TNNIL contains all atomic propositions,
• if A,B ∈ TNNIL, then A ∨B,A ∧B,✷A ∈ TNNIL,
• if all → occurring in A are contained in the scope of a ✷ (or equivalently A ∈ NOI) and
A,B ∈ TNNIL, then A→ B ∈ TNNIL.
Let TNNIL✷ indicates the set of all the propositions like A(✷B1, . . . ,✷Bn), such that A(p1, . . . , pn)
is an arbitrary non-modal proposition and B1, . . . , Bn ∈ TNNIL.
Here we define A+ to be the TNNIL-formula approximating A. Informally speaking, to find A+,
we first compute A∗ and then replace all outer boxed formula ✷B in A by ✷B+. More precisely, we
define A+ by induction on the maximum number of nesting ✷’s. Suppose that A′(p1, . . . , pn) and
✷B1, . . . ,✷Bn are such that A = A
′[p1|✷B1, . . . , pn|✷Bn], where A′ is a non-modal proposition and
p1, . . . , pn are fresh atomic variables (not occurred in A). It is clear that each Bi has less number of
nesting ✷’s and then we can define A+ := (A′)∗[p1|✷B
+
1 , . . . , pn|✷B
+
n ].
For a modal proposition A, let B(p1, . . . , pn) is the unique (modulo permutation of pi) non-modal
proposition such that A := B(✷C1, . . . ,✷Cn). Then define A
− := B(✷C+1 , . . . ,✷C
+
n ). Next we may
define the theory iHσ as follows:
Definition 3.28. We define the Visser’s axiom schema
V := A↔ A−
Then define the following modal systems:
• iHσ := iGLLe+V,
• iH∗∗σ := {A : iHσ ⊢ A
✷},
• iH∗σ := {A : iHσ ⊢ A
✷↓}.
Remark 3.29. The definitions of iHσ in [AM18, sec. 4.3] and iH
∗∗
σ in [AM19, def. 3.16] (which were
called iH∗σ there) are presented in some other equivalent way. For the sake of simplicity of definitions,
we preferred Definition 3.28 here. To see an axiomatization for iH∗∗σ , we refer the reader to [AM19].
Lemma 3.30. IPC✷  (A
+ ∧ (A→ B)+)→ B+.
Proof. By definition of (.)+, for every C we have C+ = (C−)∗. Since IPC✷ ⊢ (A− ∧ (A →
B)−) → B−, by Lemma 3.26 we have IPC✷ ⊢ (A− ∧ (A → B)−)∗ → (B−)∗. Then we have
IPC✷ ⊢ (A+ ∧ (A→ B)+)→ B+ by the argument at the beginning of proof. ✷
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Lemma 3.31. Let A be a modal proposition. Then iK4 ⊢ A✷↑ ↔ ✷. A✷↑.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A. ✷
Lemma 3.32. For arbitrary A ∈ TNNIL✷ we have iK4+ CPa ⊢ ✷. Al ↔ ✷. A✷↑.
Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A:
• A is atomic: then Al = A and A✷↑ = ✷. A. Hence by CPa we have the desired equivalency.
• A is boxed: (✷A)l = ✷A = (✷A)✷↑.
• A = B∧C: then (B∧C)l = Bl∧Cl and (B∧C)✷↑ = B✷↑∧C✷↑. Hence by induction hypothesis
we have the desired result.
• A = B ∨C: then (B ∨C)l = ✷. Bl ∨ ✷. Cl and (B ∨C)✷↑ = B✷↑ ∨C✷↑. Using Lemma 3.31 we
have iK4 ⊢ (B ∨ C)✷↑ ↔ (✷. B✷↑ ∨ ✷. C✷↑) and hence induction hypothesis implies the desired
result.
• A = B → C and B ∈ NOI: then (B → C)l = B → Cl and (B → C)✷↑ = ✷. (B✷↑ → C✷↑).
Observe that
1. iK4 ⊢ ✷. ✷. E ↔ ✷. E for any A,
2. iK4+ CPa ⊢ B✷↑ ↔ B,
3. iK4 ⊢ ✷. (B → E)↔ ✷. (B → ✷. E) for any B ∈ NOI and arbitrary E.
We have the following equivalences in iK4+ CPa:
✷. A✷↑ ↔ ✷. (B✷↑ → C✷↑) by first observation
✷. (B✷↑ → C✷↑)↔ ✷. (B → C✷↑) by second observation
✷. (B → C✷↑)↔ ✷. (B → ✷. C✷↑) by third observation
✷. (B → ✷. C✷↑)↔ ✷. (B → ✷. Cl) by induction hypothesis
✷. (B → ✷. Cl)↔ ✷. (B → Cl) by third observation
✷
Lemma 3.33. For A ∈ TNNIL✷ we have iK4+ Le+ + CPa ⊢ A↔ A✷↓.
Proof. Use induction on the complexity of A. The only nontrivial case is when A = ✷B. We have
the following equivalences in iK4+ Le+ + CPa:
(✷B)✷↓ ↔ ✷(B✷) by definition
✷(B✷)↔ ✷
(
(B✷↓)✷↑
)
by Remark 3.3
✷
(
(B✷↓)✷↑
)
↔ ✷(B✷↑) by induction hypothesis
✷(B✷↑)↔ ✷Bl by Lemma 3.32
✷Bl ↔ ✷B by the axiom schema Le+
✷
Theorem 3.34. For any TNNIL-proposition A, iGLC ⊢ A implies iGLLe+ ⊢ A.
Proof. See [AM18] Theorem 4.24. ✷
Theorem 3.35. For any TNNIL✷-proposition A, iGLCPCa ⊢ A implies iGLLe
+P ⊢ A. Also iGLCSPCa ⊢
A implies iGLLe+SP ⊢ A.
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Proof. Both statements proved by induction on proofs. The only non-trivial case is when A is an
axiom instance of the form ✷A such that iGLC ⊢ A. In this case, Theorem 3.34 implies iGLLe+ ⊢ A.
Hence by necessitation which is available in iGLLe+ we have iGLLe+ ⊢ ✷A. Hence iGLLe+P ⊢ A and
iGLLe+SP ⊢ A. ✷
3.3 Intuitionistic Modal Kripke Semantics
Let us first review results and notations from [Iem01] which will be used here. Assume two binary
relations R and S on a set. Define α(R ;S)γ iff there exists some β such that αRβ and βSγ. We
use the binary relation symbol 4 always as a reflexive relation and ≺ for the irreflexive part of 4,
i.e. u ≺ v holds iff u 4 v and u 6= v. Moreover we use the mirror image of a relational symbol for
its inverse, e.g. ≻ for ≺−1 and so on.
A Kripke model K, for intuitionistic modal logic, is a quadruple (K,4,❁, V ), such that K is a
set (we call its elements as nodes), (K,≺) is a partial ordering, ❁ is a binary relation on K such
that (4 ; ❁) ⊆ ❁, and V is a binary relation between nodes and atomic variables such that αV p
and α4β implies βV p. Then we can extend V to the modal language with ❁ corresponding to ✷
and 4 for intuitionistic →. More precisely, we define  inductively as an extension of V as follows:
• K, α  p iff αV p, for atomic variable p,
• K, α  A ∨B iff K, α  A or K, α  B,
• K, α  A ∧B iff K, α  A and K, α  B,
• K, α 1 ⊥ and K, α  ⊤,
• K, α  A→ B iff for all β<α, K, β  A implies K, β  B,
• K, α  ✷A iff for all β with α ❁ β, we have K, β  A.
Also we define the local truth in this way:
• K, α |= p iff αV p, for atomic variable p,
• K, α |= A ∨B iff K, α |= A or K, α |= B,
• K, α |= A ∧B iff K, α |= A and K, α |= B,
• K, α 6|= ⊥ and K, α |= ⊤,
• K, α |= A→ B iff either K, α 6|= A or K, α |= B,
• K, α |= ✷A iff for all β with α ❁ β, we have K, β  A.
The classical truth K, α |=c A is defined similar to K, α |= A, except for the boxed case:
• K, α |=c ✷A iff for all β ❂ α we have K, β |=c A.
For a boolean interpretation I, we also define the local I-truth K, α, I |= A and the classical
I-truth K, α, I |=c A, similar to K, α |= A, and K, α |= A, except for atomic variables p which we
define:
• K, α, I |= p iff I |= p iff K, α, I |=c p.
Remark 3.36. Note that when we consider the classical truth for a Kripke model K = (K,❁,4, V ),
we are ignoring the 4 from K and it would collapse to the well known Kripke semantic for the
classical modal logic Kc := (K,⊑, V ). The same argument holds for the classical I-truth, except for
the valuation V , which should be modified according to I, more precisely, K, α, I |=c A iff K
I
c , α |= A,
in which KIc := (K,❁, V
I
α ) is a classical Kripke semantic for classical modal logic with
β V Iα p ⇔ (β 6= α ∧ β V p) ∨ (β = α ∧ I |= p)
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In the rest of paper, we may simply write α  A for K, α  A, if no confusion is likely. By an
induction on the complexity of A, one can observe that α  A implies β  A for all A and α4β.
We define the following notions.
• If α4β, β is above α and α is beneath β. If α ❁ β, β is a successor of α. We say that β is
an immediate successor of α, if α ❁ β and there is no γ such that α ❁ γ ❁ β.
• We say that α is ❁-branching, if the set of immediate successors of α is not singleton.
• A Kripke model is finite if its set of nodes is finite.
• (α❁) indicates the set of successors of α, and (α≺) and (α4) are defined similarly.
• α is classical, if (α≺) = ∅.
• α is quasi-classical, if (α≺) = (α❁).
• α is complete if (α❁) ⊆ (α≺). Also we say that α is atom-complete if α  p and α ❁ β implies
β  p, for every atomic variable p.
• Let ϕ indicates some property for nodes in K and X ⊆ K. We say that K is X-ϕ, if every
α ∈ X has the property ϕ. If X = {α}, we may use α-ϕ instead. We say that K has the
property ϕ, or simply “is ϕ”, if it isK-ϕ. For example if we set Suc :=
⋃
α∈K(α❁), Suc-classical
means that every ❁-accessible node is classical.
• K is called neat iff α ❁ γ and α 4 β 4 γ implies α ❁ β or β ❁ γ.
• K is called brilliant iff (❁ ;4) ⊆❁ [Iem01]. Note that α ❁ ;4 β iff there is some δ such that
α ❁ δ 4 β.
• We say that K has tree frame, if (K,≺ ∪ ❁) is tree. A tree is a partial order (X,<) such that
for every x ∈ X , the set {y ∈ X : y ≤ x} is finite linearly ordered.
• K is called semi-perfect iff it is (1) with finite tree frame, (2) brilliant, (3) neat and (4) ❁ is
irreflexive and transitive. We say that K is perfect if it is semi-perfect and complete. Note
that every quasi-classical Kripke model with finite tree frame is perfect.
• We say that a Kripke model K is A-sound at α (α is A-sound), if for every boxed subformula
✷B of A we have K, α |= ✷B → B.
• Suppose X is a set of propositions that is closed under sub-formulae (we call such X adequate).
An X-saturated set of propositions Γ with respect to some logic L is a consistent subset of X
such that
– For each A ∈ X , Γ ⊢L A implies A ∈ Γ.
– For each A ∨B ∈ X , Γ ⊢L A ∨B implies A ∈ Γ or B ∈ Γ.
Lemma 3.37. Let 0L A and let X be an adequate set. Then there is an X-saturated set Γ such
that Γ 0 A.
Proof. See [Iem01]. ✷
Theorem 3.38. iGLC is sound and complete for perfect Kripke models. Also iGLCT is sound and
complete for perfect quasi-classical Kripke models.
Proof. See [AM18, Theorem 4.26] for iGLC and [Vis82, Lemma 6.14] for iGLCT. ✷
Since iGLC and iGLCT have finite model property, as it is expected, we can easily deduce the
decidability of iGLC and iGLCT:
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Corollary 3.39. iGLC and iGLCT are decidable.
Proof. For iGLC see [AM18, Corollary 4.27]. iGLCT is similar and left to the reader. ✷
Lemma 3.40. Let A be a modal proposition and K = (K,4,❁, V ) be a semi-perfect Kripke model.
Then for every quasi-classical node α ∈ K we have
K, α  A✷ ⇐⇒ K, α |= A✷
Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A. The only non-trivial case is when A = B → C.
Let K, α 1 ✷. (B✷ → C✷). If K, α 1 ✷(B✷ → C✷) then evidently K, α 6|= ✷(B✷ → C✷) and we
are done. If K, α 1 B✷ → C✷, then there exists some β < α such that K, β  B✷ and K, β 1 C✷.
Since α is quasi classical, hence β ❂ α or β = α. If β ❂ α, we have K, α 6|= ✷(B✷ → C✷) and
we are done. Otherwise, K, α  B✷ and K, α 1 C✷ and hence by induction hypothesis we have
K, α |= B✷ and K, α 6|= C✷ and we are done. For the other way around, let K, α 6|= ✷. (B✷ → C✷).
If K, α 6|= ✷(B✷ → C✷), evidently we have K, α 1 ✷(B✷ → C✷) and we are done. Otherwise, let
K, α 6|= B✷ → C✷. Then K, α |= B✷ and K, α 6|= C✷. Induction hypothesis implies K, α  B✷ and
K, α 1 C✷ and hence K, α 1 ✷. (B✷ → C✷). ✷
Corollary 3.41. Let A be a modal proposition and K is a semi-perfect quasi-classical Kripke model.
Then for every node α we have
K, α  A✷ ⇐⇒ K, α |= A✷ ⇐⇒ K, α |=c A
✷
K, α |= A✷↓ ⇐⇒ K, α |=c A
✷↓ and K, α, I |= A✷↓ ⇐⇒ K, α, I |=c A
✷↓
Proof. By Lemma 3.40, for every node α we have K, α  A✷ iff K, α |= A✷. One can easily observe
by induction on the height of the node α ∈ K that K, α  A✷ iff K, α |=c A✷. ✷
Corollary 3.42. Let A be a modal proposition and K is a semi-perfect quasi-classical Kripke model.
Then for every node α we have
K, α  A ⇐⇒ K, α |= A✷↑
Proof. Observe that K, α |= B✷↓ ↔ B, K, α  B✷ ↔ B and B✷ = (B✷↑)✷↓. Hence by Corollary 3.41
we have K, α  A iff K, α  A✷ iff K, α |= (A✷↑)✷↓ iff K, α |= A✷↑. ✷
3.3.1 The Smory´nski Operation
In this subsection, we define the Smoryn´ski operation on Kripke models [Smo85]. Given a Kripke
model K = (K,4,❁, V ) and some fixed node α ∈ K, define K′ := (K ′,4′,❁′, V ′) as the Kripke
model constituted by adding one fresh node α′ to K. All nodes of K′ other than α′, forces the same
atomic variables and have the same accessibility relationships as they did in K. Also α′ imitates all
relationships of α. More precisely K′ is constituted as follows:
• K ′ := K ∪ {α′}, in which α′ 6∈ K,
• β 4′ γ iff β 4 γ for every β, γ ∈ K,
• β ❁′ γ iff β ❁ γ for every β, γ ∈ K,
• β V ′ p iff β V p for every β ∈ K,
• α′ V ′ p iff α V p,
• α′ 4′ β iff (α 4 β or β = α′). Also β 4′ α′ iff β = α,
• α′ ❁′ β iff α ⊑ β. Also β 6❁′ α′ for every β ∈ K ′.
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Then we define K(n) and αn inductively:
• K(0) := K and α0 := α,
• K(n+1) :=
(
K(n)
)′
and αn+1 is defined as the fresh node which is added to K
(n) in the definition
of
(
K(n)
)′
.
Lemma 3.43. Let K be a Kripke model which is A✷↓-sound at the quasi-classical node α. Then for
every subformula B of A✷↓ and arbitrary boolean interpretation I we have
1. K, α |= B iff K′, α′ |= B.
2. K, α, I |= B iff K′, α′, I |= B.
3. α′ is quasi-classical and K′ is A✷↓-sound at α′.
4. If K is semi-perfect, perfect or quasi-classical, then K′ is so.
Proof. 1. Use induction on the complexity of B. All cases are trivial, except for the case B = ✷C✷.
If α′ |= ✷C✷, evidently α |= ✷C✷ as well. If α |= ✷C✷, then by A✷↓-soundness, α |= C✷, and by
Lemma 3.40, α  C✷. Hence α′ |= ✷C✷.
2. Similar to first item and left to the reader.
3. The fact that α′ is quasi-classical can easily be observed by the definition of K′ and left to the
reader. The A✷↓-soundness, is derived from first item.
4. Easy and left to the reader.
✷
4 Reduction of Arithmetical Completenesses
Let us define [[A;T,U; Γ]] as the set of all Γ-substitutions σ such that U 0 σ
T
(A). Hence PL
Γ
(T,U) =
{A : [[A;T,U; Γ]] = ∅}. For an arithmetical substitution σ, let [[σ]] indicate the propositional closure
of σ, i.e. the smallest set X of arithmetical substitutions with the following conditions:
• σ ∈ X ,
• if α ∈ X , τ is some L✷-substitution and T is some recursively axiomatizable arithmetical
theory, then α
T
◦ τ ∈ X .
Note that the substitution α
T
◦ τ is defined on atomic variable p in this way: α
T
◦ τ(p) := α
T
(τ(p)).
Let V
0
be a modal theory. We define the Γ-arithmetical completeness of V
0
with respect to T
relative in U as follows:
AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≡ A ∈ PL
Γ
(T,U) implies V
0
⊢ A, for every A ∈ L✷
Similarly we define the Arithmetical soundness AS
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) as follows:
ASΓ(V0 ;T,U) ≡ V0 ⊢ A implies A ∈ PLΓ(T,U), for every A ∈ L✷
When Γ is the set of all arithmetical sentences, we may omit the subscript Γ in the notations
PL
Γ
(T,U), AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) and AS
Γ
(V
0
;T,U).
Note that PL
Γ
(T,U) = V
0
iff AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) and AS
Γ
(V
0
;T,U).
In the following definition, we formalize reduction of the arithmetical completeness of V
0
to V′
0
:
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Definition 4.1. Let T and T′ be consistent recursively axiomatizable and U and U′ be strong
enough arithmetical theories. Also let Γ and Γ′ be sets of arithmetical sentences and V
0
,V′
0
be
modal theories. We say that f, f¯ propositionally reduces AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) to AC
Γ′
(V′
0
;T′,U′), with the
notation AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≤f,f¯ ACΓ′ (V
′
0
;T′,U′), if:
R0. f : L✷ −→ L✷ and f¯ = {f¯A}A is a family of functions,
R1. V′
0
⊢ f(A) implies V
0
⊢ A,
R2. for every A ∈ L✷, f¯A is a function on arithmetical substitutions and
f¯
A
: [[f(A);T′,U′; Γ′]] −→ [[A;T,U; Γ]] and for every α: f¯
A
(σ) ∈ [[σ]].
We say that ACΓ(V0 ;T,U) is reducible to ACΓ′ (V
′
0
;T′,U′), with the notation
AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≤ AC
Γ′
(V′
0
;T′,U′),
if there exists some f, f¯ such that AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≤f,f¯ ACΓ′ (V
′
0
;T′,U′).
Following theorems are what one expect from the reduction:
Theorem 4.2. The reduction of arithmetical completenesses is a transitive reflexive relation.
Proof. The reflexivity is trivial and left to the reader. For the transitivity, let
AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≤f,f¯ ACΓ′ (V
′
0
;T′,U′) ≤g,g¯ ACΓ′′ (V
′′
0
;T′′,U′′)
and observe that
AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≤h,h¯ ACΓ′′ (V
′′
0
;T′′,U′′)
in which h := g ◦ f and h¯
A
:= f¯
A
◦ g¯
f(A)
. ✷
Theorem 4.3. AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≤f,f¯ ACΓ′ (V
′
0
;T′,U′) and AC
Γ′
(V′
0
;T′,U′) implies AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U).
Proof. Let V
0
0 A. Then by R1 in the Definition 4.1, V′
0
0 f(A). Hence by AC
Γ′
(V′
0
;T′,U′), there
exists some Γ′-substitution σ such that U′ 0 σ
T′
(f(A)), or in other words σ ∈ [[f(A);T′,U′; Γ′]].
Hence by R2 f¯
A
(σ) ∈ [[A;T,U; Γ]], which implies A ∈ PL
Γ
(T,U). ✷
Remark 4.4. Note that the requirement f¯
A
(α) ∈ [[α]], did not used in the proof of arithmetical
completeness of V
0
in Theorem 4.3. The only usage of this condition, is to restrict the way one
may compute f¯
A
(α) from α: only propositional substitutions are allowed to be composed by α to
produce f¯
A
(α). If we remove this restriction from the definition, we would have a trivial reduction:
every arithmetical completeness would be reducible to everyone.
Corollary 4.5. If AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≤f,f¯ ACΓ′ (V
′
0
;T′,U′) and AC
Γ′
(V′
0
;T′,U′), then we have
V
0
⊢ A ⇐⇒ V′
0
⊢ f(A)
Proof. The direction ⇐= holds by definition. For the other way around, use Theorem 4.3. ✷
Remark 4.6. Note that V0 ⊢ A ⇐⇒ V
′
0
⊢ f(A) is not enough for reduction of the arithmetical
completenesses. This is simply because f does not have anything to do with the arithmetical
substitutions. So one may not be able to translate an arithmetical refutation from PL
Γ′
(T′,U′) to a
refutation from PL
Γ
(T,U), via propositional translations. If we remove the condition 3 and replace
second item by V
0
⊢ A ⇐⇒ V′
0
⊢ f(A) in the Definition 4.1, AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) would be reducible to
every arithmetical completeness via the following vicious reduction:
f(A) :=
{
⊤ : if V
0
⊢ A
⊥ : otherwise
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Notation 4.7. In the rest of the paper, we are going to characterize several provability logics. Our
main tool for proving their arithmetical completeness is the reduction of arithmetical completenesses
Theorem 4.3. The notation V
0
= PL
Γ
(T,U) ≤ PL
Γ′
(T′,U′) = V′
0
means that the following items
hold: (1) AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≤ AC
Γ′
(V′
0
;T′,U′), (2) V
0
= PL
Γ
(T,U), (3) PL
Γ′
(T′,U′) = V′
0
.
Let the provability logics PLΓ(T,U) = V0 and PLΓ′ (T
′,U′) = V′
0
are already characterized. Then
the notation PL
Γ
(T,U) ≤ PL
Γ′
(T′,U′) indicates AC
Γ
(V
0
;T,U) ≤ AC
Γ′
(V′
0
;T′,U′).
Theorem 4.8. Let PL
Γ
(T,U) ≤f,f¯ PLΓ′ (T
′,U′) for some computable function f . Then the decid-
ability of PL
Γ′
(T′,U′) implies the decidability of PL
Γ
(T,U).
Proof. Direct consequence of Corollary 4.5 and computability of f . ✷
4.1 Two special cases
In later applications, always we consider two simple cases of reduction f, f¯ (Definition 4.1) to provide
new arithmetical completenesses:
• Identity: in this case we consider f¯
A
as identity function and f(A) is some propositional
translation like (.)✷ or (.)✷↓.
• Substitution: in this case, we let f(A) as some L✷-substitution, possibly depending on A. Also
f¯
A
(σ) := σ
T′
◦ τ .
5 Relative Σ1-provability logics for HA
In this section, we will characterize PL
Σ1
(HA,N), i.e. the truth Σ1-provability logic of HA, and
PL
Σ1
(HA,PA), i.e. the Σ1-provability logic of HA, relative to PA. We also show that PLΣ1 (HA,N)
is hardest among the Σ1-provability logics of HA relative in HA,PA,N. In other words:
PL
Σ1
(HA,PA) PL
Σ1
(HA,HA) PLΣ1 (HA,N)
(.)¬↑
5.19
✷(.)
5.20
Diagram 1: Reductions for relative provability logics of HA
5.1 Kripke Semantic
Lemma 5.1. For every A we have
iGLC ⊢ A ⇐⇒ iGL ⊢

✷. ∧
E∈sub(A)
(E → ✷E)

→ A
Proof. For the simplicity of notations, in this proof, let
ϕ := ✷.
∧
E∈sub(A)
(E → ✷E)
and ⊢ indicates derivablity in iGL+ ϕ.
One side is trivial. For the other way around, assume that iGL 0 ϕ → A. We will construct some
perfect Kripke model K = (K,❁,4, V ) such that K, α 1 A, which by soundness of iGLC for finite
brilliant models with ❁⊆≺, we have the desired result. The proof is almost identical to the proof of
Theorem 3.38 in [AM18, Theorem 4.26], but to be self-contained, we repeat it here.
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Let Sub(A) be the set of sub-formulae of A. Then define
X := {B,✷B | B ∈ Sub(A)}
It is obvious that X is a finite adequate set. We define K = (K,4,❁, V ) as follows. Take K as
the set of all X-saturated sets with respect to iGL+ ϕ, and 4 is the subset relation over K. Define
α ❁ β iff for all ✷B ∈ X , ✷B ∈ α implies B ∈ β, and also there exists some ✷C ∈ β \ α. Finally
define αV p iff p ∈ α, for atomic p.
It only remains to show that K is a finite brilliant Kripke model with ❁⊆≺ which refutes A. To
this end, we first show by induction on B ∈ X that B ∈ α iff α  B, for each α ∈ K. The only
non-trivial case is B = ✷C. Let ✷C 6∈ α. We must show α 1 ✷C. The other direction is easier to
prove and we leave it to reader. Let β0 := {D ∈ X | α ⊢ ✷D}. If β0,✷C ⊢ C, since by definition of
β0, we have α ⊢ ✷β0 and hence by Lo¨b’s axiom, α ⊢ ✷C, which is in contradiction with ✷C 6∈ α.
Hence β0,✷C 0 C and so there exists some X-saturated set β such that β 0 C, β ⊇ β0 ∪ {✷C}.
Hence β ∈ K and α ❁ β. Then by the induction hypothesis, β 1 C and hence α 1 ✷C.
Since iGL + ϕ 0 A, by Lemma 3.37, there exists some X-saturated set α ∈ K such that α 0 A,
and hence by the above argument we have α 1 A.
K trivially satisfies all the properties of finite brilliant Kripke model with ❁⊆≺. As a sample,
we show that why ❁⊆≺ holds. Assume α ❁ β and let B ∈ α. If B = ✷C for some C, then by
definition, C ∈ β and since C → ✷C is a conjunct in ϕ, we have β ⊢ ✷C and we are done. So
assume B is not a boxed formula. Then by definition of X , we have ✷B ∈ X and since B → ✷B
is a conjunct in ϕ, we have α ⊢ ✷B and hence by definition of ❁, it is the case that B ∈ β. This
shows α ⊆ β and hence α 4 β. But α is not equal to β, because α ❁ β implies existence of some
✷C ∈ β \ α. Hence α ≺ β, as desired. ✷
Lemma 5.2. For any proposition A, if iGLC ⊢ A✷ then iGL+ CPa +✷CP ⊢ A✷.
Proof. Let iGLC ⊢ A. Hence by Lemma 5.1 for some finite set X of subformulas of A✷ we have
iGL ⊢ ✷.
( ∧
E∈X
E → ✷E
)
→ A✷
Lemma 3.7 implies
iGL ⊢ ✷
( ∧
E∈X
E → ✷E
)
∧
( ∧
E∈X
✷. (E✷↑ → ✷E)
)
→ A✷
By Lemma 3.8 we have iGL+ CPa +✷CP ⊢ A
✷. ✷
Theorem 5.3. iGLCPCa is sound and complete for local truth at quasi-classical nodes in perfect
Kripke models. More precisely, we have iGLCPCa ⊢ A iff K, α |= A for every perfect Kripke model
K and the quasi-classical node α.
Proof. The soundness part easily derived by the soundness of iGLC and left to the reader.
Since local truth at α is not affected by changing the set of 4-accessible nodes from α, it is enough
to prove the completeness part only for the perfect Kripke models. Let iGLCPCa 0 A. Let A′ be a
boolean equivalent of A which is a conjunction of implications E → F in which E is a conjunction
of a set of atomics or boxed propositions and F is a disjunction of atomics or boxed proposition.
Evidently such A′ exists for every A. Hence iGLCPCa 0 A′. Then there must be some conjunct
E → F of A′ such that iGLCPCa 0 (E → F )✷, E is a conjunction of atomic and boxed propositions
and F is a disjunction of atomic and boxed propositions. Hence iGL + CPa + ✷CP 0 (E → F )✷
and by Lemma 5.2 we have iGLC 0 (E → F )✷. By Theorem 3.38, there exists some perfect Kripke
model K = (K,4,❁, V ) such that K, α 1 (E → F )✷ for some α ∈ K. Since iGLC is sound for K,
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we have K, α 1 E → F . Hence there exists some β < α such that K, β  E and K, β 1 F . Then by
definition of local truth we have K, β |= E and K, β 6|= F . Then K, β 6|= E → F . Hence K, β 6|= A,
as desired. ✷
Corollary 5.4. iGLCPCa is decidable.
Proof. Direct consequence of the proof of Theorem 5.3 and decidability of iGLC (Corollary 3.39). ✷
Theorem 5.5. iGLCSPCa ⊢ A✷↓ iff K, α |= A✷↓ for every perfect Kripke models K and quasi-classical
A✷↓-sound nodes α.
Proof. Both directions are non-trivial and proved contra-positively. For the soundness part, assume
that K, α 6|= A✷↓ for some perfect Kripke model K := (K,4,❁, V ) which is A✷↓-sound at the quasi-
classical node α ∈ K. Since derivability is finite, it is enough to show that for every finite set Γ of
modal propositions we have
iGLCPCa 0
∧
B∈Γ
(✷B → B)→ A✷↓.
By Theorem 5.3 and Lemma 3.43, it is enough to find some number i such that
K(i), αi 6|=
∧
B∈Γ
(✷B → B)→ A✷↓.
Let us define ni and mi as the number of propositions in the sets Ni := {B ∈ Γ : K(i), αi |= B∧✷B}
and Mi := {B ∈ Γ : K(i), αi |= ✷B ∧ ¬B}, respectively.
We use induction as follows. As induction hypothesis, assume that for any number i with ni < k
there is some 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 + ni such that
(5.1) K(i+j), αi+j 6|=
∧
B∈Γ
(✷B → B)→ A✷↓
Let ni = k. If mi = 0, we may let j = 0 and by Lemma 3.43 we have eq. (5.1) as desired. So let
B ∈ Γ such that K(i), αi |= ✷B ∧ ¬B. We have two sub-cases:
• mi+1 = 0: observe in this case that eq. (5.1) holds for j = 1.
• mi+1 > 0: in this case we have ni+1 < k and hence by application of the induction hypothesis
with i := i+ 1, we get some 0 ≤ j′ ≤ 1 + ni+1 such that
K(i+1+j
′), αi+1+j′ 6|=
∧
B∈Γ
(✷B → B)→ A✷↓
Hence if we let j := j′ + 1 we have 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 + ni and eq. (5.1), as desired.
For the completeness part, assume that iGLCSPCa 0 A✷↓. Hence
iGLCPCa 0

 ∧
✷B∈Sub(A)
(✷B → B)

→ A✷↓
Hence Theorem 5.3 implies the desired result. ✷
Corollary 5.6. iGLCSPCa is decidable.
Proof. First observe that by Theorems 5.3 and 5.5, we have iGLCSPCa ⊢ A✷↓ iff
iGLCPCa ⊢
∧
✷B∈Sub(A✷↓)
(✷B → B)→ A✷↓.
Hence the decidability of iGLCPCa (Corollary 5.4) implies the decidability of iGLCSPCa. ✷
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5.2 Arithmetical interpretations
The following theorem is the main result in [AM18]:
Theorem 5.7. iHσ is the Σ1-provability logic of HA, i.e. iHσ ⊢ A iff for all Σ1-substitution σ we
have HA ⊢ σHA (A). Moreover iHσ is decidable.
Here we bring some essential facts and definitions from [AM18]. Let us fix some perfect Kripke
model K0 = (K0,❁0,40, V0) with the quasi-classical root α0 and its extension K := K
′
0 = (K,4
,❁, V ) by the Smoryn´ski operation with the new quasi-classical root α1 (which was called α0 in
[AM18]) and define a recursive function F , called Solovay function, as we did in [AM18]. We have
the following definitions and facts from [AM18]: (later we refer to them simply as e.g. “item 1”,)
1. The function F is provably total in HA and hence we may use the function symbol F inside
HA and stronger theories.
2. The Σ1-substitution σ is defined in this way:
σ(p) :=
∨
K,αp
∃x(F (x) = α)
3. Define L = α as ∃x∀y ≥ xF (y) = α.
4. PA ⊢ ∃x (F (x) = α)→
∨
β<α L = β. [AM18, Lemma 5.2]
5. For a modal proposition A when we use A in a context which it is expected to be some
first-order formula, like HA ⊢ A, we should replace A with the first-order sentence σHA (A).
6. For every A ∈ sub(Γ)∩TNNIL and α ∈ K0 such that K0, α  A, we have HA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = α→
A. [AM18, Lemma 5.18 & 5.19]
7. For each B ∈ Sub(Γ) ∩ TNNIL and α ∈ K such that α 1 ✷B,
HA ⊢ L=α→ ¬✷B.
8. N |= L = α1 and PA + L = α is consistent for every α ∈ K. [AM18, Corollaries 5.20 & 5.24
and Lemma 5.23]
Lemma 5.8. For every A ∈ NOI ∩ sub(Γ) such that K, α1 1 A, we have
HA ⊢ A↔
∨
α∈K and K,αA
∃xF (x) = α
Proof. First observe that by Π2-conservativity of PA over HA (Lemma 3.13), it is enough to prove
this lemma in PA instead of HA. Then by “item 4”, it is enough to show that
PA ⊢ A↔
∨
α∈K and K,αA
L = α
We use induction on the complexity of A. Since A ∈ NOI we do not consider the → case in the
induction steps:
• A is atomic: by definition of the arithmetical substitution, we have
σ(A) =
∨
α∈K and K,αA
∃xF (x) = α.
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• A = B ◦ C and ◦ ∈ {∨,∧}: easy and left to the reader.
• A = ✷B: first note that by “item 6”, PA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = α → A for every α  A (here actually
we need α1 1 A). Hence
PA ⊢
∨
α∈K and K,αA
∃xF (x) = α→ A
For the other direction, it is enough (by “item 4”) to show that for every β ∈ K such that
K, β 1 A we have PA ⊢ A→ L 6= β or equivalently PA ⊢ L = β → ¬A, which holds by “item
7”. ✷
Lemma 5.9. For every A ∈ sub(Γ) and α ∈ K0, we have{
K, α |= A =⇒ HA ⊢ L = α→ A
K, α 6|= A =⇒ HA ⊢ L = α→ ¬A
Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A. All cases are simple and we only treat the case
A = ✷B here. If K, α |= ✷B, by definition, K, α  ✷B and hence by “item 6” we have the desired
result. If also K, α 6|= ✷B, by definition, K, α 1 ✷B and hence by “item 7” we have the desired
result. ✷
Lemma 5.10. Let K be A✷↓-sound at α0 for some A
✷↓ ∈ sub(Γ). Then for every B ∈ sub(A✷↓) we
have 

K, α1 |= B =⇒ HA ⊢ L = α1 → B
K, α1 6|= B =⇒ HA ⊢ L = α1 → ¬B
K, α1  B =⇒ HA ⊢ B
Proof. We prove this by induction on the complexity of B ∈ sub(A✷↓).
• B is atomic, conjunction or disjunction: easy and left to the reader.
• B = E → F : it is easy to show the first two derivations and we leave them to the reader.
For the third one, assume that K, α1  E → F . If K, α1  F we have the desired result by
induction hypothesis. So let K, α1 1 F and Hence K, α1 1 E. Hence by Lemma 5.8, we have
HA ⊢ E →
∨
αE ∃xF (x) = α. On the other hand by “item 6” we have HA ⊢
∨
αE ∃xF (x) =
α→ F . Hence we have HA→ E → F .
• B = ✷C✷: Let K, α1 |= ✷C✷. Then by Lemma 3.43 we have K, α1 |= C✷ and hence by
Lemma 3.40 K, α1  C
✷. Then by induction hypothesis HA ⊢ C✷ and hence HA ⊢ L = α1 →
✷C✷.
For the second derivation, Let K, α1 6|= ✷C✷. Then by “item 7” we have the desired result.
For the third derivation, let K, α1  ✷C✷. Then by Lemma 3.40 we have K, α1 |= ✷C✷ and
hence Lemma 3.43 implies K, α1 |= C✷ and then again byLemma 3.40 K, α1  C✷. Then by
induction hypothesis HA ⊢ C✷ and hence HA ⊢ ✷C✷.
✷
5.3 Arithmetical Completeness
Definition 5.11. Define the following modal systems:
• iHσP := iHσ plus P,
• iHσSP := iHσP plus S,
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• iHσP
∗ := {A ∈ L✷ : iHσP ⊢ A✷↓},
• iHσSP
∗ := {A ∈ L✷ : iHσSP ⊢ A✷↓}.
Obviously iHσSP
∗ and iHσP
∗ are closed under modus ponens.
Theorem 5.12. iHσP = PLΣ1 (HA,PA), i.e. iHσP is the relative Σ1-provability logic of HA in PA.
Proof. The soundness easily deduced by use of the soundness of the iHσ for arithmetical interpreta-
tions in HA (see Theorem 6.3 in [AM18]).
For the other way around, let iHσP 0 A. Then iHσP 0 A− in which A− ∈ TNNIL✷ and
iHσ ⊢ A ↔ A−. Then iGLLe+P 0 A− and hence by Theorem 3.35 we have iGLCPCa 0 A−. By
Theorem 5.3, there is some perfect Kripke model K0 with the quasi-classical root α0 such that
K0, α0 6|= A−. Let σ be the Σ1-substitution as provided in Section 5.2 for the Kripke model K0 and
its Smoryn´ski extension K with Γ := {A−}. Then by Lemma 5.9 we have HA ⊢ L = α0 → σHA (¬A−).
Since iHσ ⊢ A ↔ A−, by soundness part of Theorem 5.7 we have HA ⊢ L = α0 → σHA (¬A). Hence
by “item 8” we may deduce PA 0 σHA (A), as desired. ✷
Theorem 5.13. iHσSP = PLΣ1 (HA,N), i.e. iHσSP is the truth Σ1-provability logic of HA.
Proof. The soundness easily deduced by use of the soundness of the iHσ for arithmetical interpreta-
tions in HA (see Theorem 6.3 in [AM18]).
For the other way around, let iHσSP 0 A. Then by Lemma 3.33 we have iHσSP 0 (A−)✷↓ in which
(A−)✷↓ ∈ TNNIL✷ and iHσ ⊢ A ↔ (A−)✷↓. Then iGLLe+SP 0 (A−)✷↓ and hence by Theorem 3.35
we have iGLCSPCa 0 (A−)✷↓.
By Theorem 5.5, there is some perfect Kripke model K0 with the quasi-classical (A
−)✷↓-sound
root α0 such that K0, α0 6|= (A−)✷↓. Let σ be the Σ1-substitution as provided in Section 5.2 for the
Kripke model K0 and its Smoryn´ski extension K with Γ := {(A−)✷↓}. Then by Lemma 5.10 we have
HA ⊢ L = α1 → σHA (¬(A−)✷↓). Since iHσ ⊢ A↔ (A−)✷↓, by soundness part of the Theorem 5.7 we
have HA ⊢ L = α1 → σHA (¬A). Hence by “item 8” we may deduce N 6|= σHA (A), as desired. ✷
5.4 Reductions
In this subsection we will show that
PLΣ1 (HA,PA) ≤ PLΣ1 (HA,HA) ≤ PLΣ1 (HA,N)
First some definition:
Definition 5.14. For A ∈ L✷ we define A¬↓, A¬↑ and A¬ as follows:
• (A ◦B)¬ := ¬¬(A¬ ◦B¬), (A ◦B)¬↑ := ¬¬(A¬↑ ◦B¬↑) and (A ◦B)¬↓ := A¬↓ ◦B¬↓,
• (✷A)¬ := ¬¬✷A¬, (✷A)¬↑ := ¬¬✷A and (✷A)¬↓ := ✷A¬,
• (¬A)¬ := ¬A¬, (¬A)¬↑ := ¬A¬↑ and (¬A)¬↓ := ¬A¬↓,
• p¬ := p¬↑ := ¬¬p and p¬↓ := p for atomic p.
For an arithmetical formula A we have these additional clauses for the definition of A¬:
• (∀xA)¬ := ¬¬∀xA¬,
• (∃xA)¬ := ¬¬∃xA¬.
Lemma 5.15. For every formula A, we have PA ⊢ A iff HA ⊢ A¬.
Proof. The direction from right to left is trivial. For the other way around, one may use induction
on the proof PA ⊢ A. For details see [TvD88]. ✷
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Lemma 5.16. For every Σ1-formula A, we have HA ⊢ A¬ ↔ ¬¬A.
Proof. Easy by use of the decidability of ∆0-formulas in HA (Lemma 3.12). ✷
Lemma 5.17. For every A ∈ L✷, we have iHσP ⊢ A iff iHσ ⊢ A
¬↑.
Proof. The direction from right to left holds by the classically valid A ↔ A¬↑. For the other way
around, one must use induction on the length of the proof iHσP ⊢ A. All cases are easy and left to
the reader. ✷
Lemma 5.18. For every A ∈ L✷, recursively axiomatizable theory T and any Σ1-substitution σ, we
have HA ⊢ (σ
T
(A))¬ ↔ σ
T
(A¬↑).
Proof. We use induction on the complexity of A. All cases are simple. For atomic and boxed cases,
use Lemma 5.16. ✷
Theorem 5.19. iHσP = PLΣ1 (HA,PA) ≤ PLΣ1 (HA,HA) = iHσ.
Proof. By Theorem 5.12 and Theorem 5.7 we have iHσP = PLΣ1 (HA,PA) and PLΣ1 (HA,HA) = iHσ.
We must show AC
Σ1
(iHσP;HA,PA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iHσ;HA,HA). Given A ∈ L✷, define f(A) := A
¬↑
and observe by Lemma 5.17 we have R1 (see Definition 4.1). Also define f¯
A
as identity function.
Then by Lemmas 5.15 and 5.18 the condition R2 holds. ✷
Theorem 5.20. iHσ = PLΣ1 (HA,HA) ≤ PLΣ1 (HA,N) = iHσSP.
Proof. By Theorems 5.7 and 5.13 we have iHσ = PLΣ1 (HA,HA) and PLΣ1 (HA,N) = iHσSP. We
must show AC
Σ1
(iHσ;HA,HA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iHσSP;HA,N). Given A ∈ L✷, define f(A) = ✷A and f¯A
as identity function.
R1. Let iHσSP ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of iHσSP = PLΣ1 (HA,N), for every Σ1-substitution σ we have
N |= σ
HA
(✷A) and hence HA ⊢ σ
HA
(A). Then by arithmetical completeness of PL
Σ1
(HA,HA),
we have iHσ ⊢ A.
One also may prove this item with a direct propositional argument. For simplicity reasons, we
chose the indirect way.
R2. Let N 6|= σ
HA
(✷A). Then HA 0 σ
HA
(A), as desired. ✷
6 Relative Σ1-provability logics for HA
∗
The σ1-provability logic of HA
∗, PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA∗), is already characterized [AM19]. In this section,
we characterize the Σ1-provability logic of HA
∗, relative in PA and N. We also show that the following
reductions hold:
Each arrow in the above diagram, indicates a reduction of the completeness of the left hand side
to the right one. Note that the diagram of the first row is already known by Theorems 5.19 and 5.20.
Theorem 6.1. iHσSP
∗ = PL
Σ1
(HA∗,N) ≤ PL
Σ1
(HA,N) = iHσSP. (See Definition 5.11)
Proof. By Theorem 5.13 we have PL
Σ1
(HA,N) = iHσSP. It is enough to prove the arithmetical
soundness ASΣ1 (iHσSP
∗;HA∗,N) and the reduction ACΣ1 (iHσSP
∗;HA∗,N) ≤ ACΣ1 (iHσSP;HA,N).
ASΣ1 (iHσSP
∗;HA∗,N): Let iHσSP∗ ⊢ A and σ is a Σ1-substitution. Then iHσSP ⊢ A✷↓, and then by
arithmetical soundness of iHσSP Theorem 5.13, we have N |= σHA(A✷↓). Hence Lemma 3.19 implies
N |= σ
HA∗
(A), as desired.
For the proof of AC
Σ1
(iHσSP
∗;HA∗,N) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iHσSP;HA,N), define f(A) := A
✷↓ and f¯
A
as
identity function.
R1. Let iHσSP ⊢ A✷↓. Then by definition we have iHσSP
∗ ⊢ A.
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PL
Σ1
(HA,PA) PL
Σ1
(HA,HA) PLΣ1 (HA,N)
PL
Σ1
(HA∗,PA) PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA) PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA∗) PL
Σ1
(HA∗,N)
(.)¬↑
5.19
✷(.)
5.20
(.)¬↑
6.6
(.)✷↓ 6.2 (.)✷↓ 6.3
✷(.)
6.7
(.)✷↑
6.5
(.)✷↓ 6.1
Diagram 2: Reductions for relative provability logics of HA∗
R2. Let N 6|= σ
HA∗
(A✷↓). Hence by Lemma 3.19 N 6|= σ
HA
(A), as desired. ✷
Theorem 6.2. iHσP
∗ = PLΣ1 (HA
∗,PA) ≤ PLΣ1 (HA,PA) = iHσP. (See Definition 5.11)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.1 and left to the reader. ✷
Theorem 6.3. iH∗σ = PLΣ1 (HA
∗,HA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(HA,HA) = iHσ. (See Definition 3.28)
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 6.1 and left to the reader. ✷
Lemma 6.4. For every A ∈ L✷ we have iH∗∗σ ⊢ A iff iH
∗
σ ⊢ A
✷↑. (See Definition 3.28)
Proof. We have the following equivalents: iH∗∗σ ⊢ A iff iHσ ⊢ A
✷ iff (by Remark 3.3) iHσ ⊢ (A
✷↑)✷↓
iff iH∗σ ⊢ A
✷↑. ✷
Theorem 6.5. iH∗∗σ = PLΣ1 (HA
∗,HA∗) ≤ PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA) = iH∗σ.
Proof. By Theorem 6.3 we have PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA) = iH∗σ. It is enough to prove the arithmetical
soundness AS
Σ1
(iH∗∗σ ;HA
∗,HA∗) and the reduction AC
Σ1
(iH∗∗σ ;HA
∗,HA∗) ≤ AC
Σ1
(iH∗σ;HA
∗,HA).
AS
Σ1
(iH∗∗σ ;HA
∗,HA∗): Let iH∗∗σ ⊢ A and σ is a Σ1-substitution. Then iHσ ⊢ A
✷, and then by
arithmetical soundness of iHσ Theorem 5.7, we have HA ⊢ σHA(A
✷). Hence Lemma 3.18 implies
HA ⊢ σ
HA∗
(A)HA, which implies HA∗ ⊢ σ
HA∗
(A).
For the proof of AC
Σ1
(iHσSP
∗;HA∗,N) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iHσSP;HA,N), define f(A) := A
✷↑ and f¯
A
as
identity function.
R1. Let iH∗σ ⊢ A
✷↑. Then by Lemma 6.4 we have iH∗∗σ ⊢ A, as desired.
R2. Let HA 0 σ
HA∗
(A✷↑). Hence by Lemma 3.17 we have HA 0 (σ
HA∗
(A))HA, which implies HA∗ 0
σ
HA∗
(A), as desired. ✷
Theorem 6.6. iHσP
∗ = PL
Σ1
(HA∗,PA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA) = iH∗σ.
Proof. iHσP
∗ = PL
Σ1
(HA∗,PA) and iH∗σ = PLΣ1 (HA
∗,HA), by Theorems 6.2 and 6.3 holds. Given
A, define f(A) := A¬↑ and f¯
A
as identity function.
R1. By definition of iHσP
∗, we have iHσP
∗ ⊢ A iff iHσP ⊢ A✷↓. The latter, by Lemma 5.17 is
equivalent to iHσ ⊢ (A✷↓)¬↑. Since (A✷↓)¬↑ = (A¬↑)✷↓, the latter is equivalent to iH∗σ ⊢ A
¬↑.
R2. By Lemmas 5.15 and 5.18. ✷
Theorem 6.7. iH∗∗σ = PLΣ1 (HA
∗,HA∗) ≤ PL
Σ1
(HA∗,N) = iHσSP∗.
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Proof. By Theorems 6.1 and 6.5 we have PL
Σ1
(HA∗,N) = iHσSP∗ and iH∗∗σ = PLΣ1 (HA
∗,HA∗). We
must show AC
Σ1
(iH∗∗σ ;HA
∗,HA∗) ≤f ,¯f ACΣ1 (iHσSP
∗;HA,N). Given A ∈ L✷, define f(A) = ✷A and
f¯
A
as identity function.
R1. Let iHσSP
∗ ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of iHσSP
∗ = PL
Σ1
(HA∗,N), for every Σ1-substitution σ
we have N |= σ
HA∗
(✷A) and hence HA∗ ⊢ σ
HA∗
(A). Then by arithmetical completeness of
PLΣ1 (HA
∗,HA∗), we have iH∗∗σ ⊢ A.
One also may prove this item with a direct propositional argument. For simplicity reasons, we
chose the indirect way.
R2. If N 6|= σ
HA∗
(✷A) evidently we have HA∗ 0 σ
HA∗
(A). ✷
7 Relative provability logics for PA
In this section, we characterize PL(PA,HA) and PL
Σ1
(PA,HA), the provability logic and Σ1-
provability logic of PA relative in HA. We show that PL(PA,HA) = iGLP and PL
Σ1
(PA,HA) =
iGLPCa. Also we show that all of the six (Σ1-) provability logics of PA relative in PA,HA,N are
reducible to PLΣ1 (HA,N):
PL(PA,HA) PL(PA,PA) PL(PA,N)
PL
Σ1
(PA,HA) PL
Σ1
(PA,PA) PL
Σ1
(PA,N)
PLΣ1 (HA,PA) PLΣ1 (HA,HA) PLΣ1 (HA,N)
7.25 τ
✷(.)
7.29
7.6.2 τ 7.6.1 τ
7.21
(.)†
✷(.)
7.29
(.)¬↑
7.27
7.22
(.)†
7.11(.)†
(.)¬↑
5.19
✷(.)
5.20
Diagram 3: Reductions for relative provability logics of PA
Let us first review some well-known results:
Theorem 7.1. We have the following provability logics:
• GL is the provability logic of PA, i.e. PL(PA,PA) = GL. [Sol76]
• GLS is the truth provability logic of PA, i.e. PL(PA,N) = GLS. [Sol76]
• GLCa is the Σ1-provability logic of PA, i.e. PLΣ1 (PA,PA) = GLCa. [Vis82]
• GLSCa is the truth Σ1-provability logic of PA, i.e. PLΣ1 (PA,N) = GLSCa. [Vis82]
Definition 7.2. A propositional modal substitution τ is called (.)✷↓-substitution, if for every atomic
variable p, there is some B such that iK4+ CPa ⊢ τ(p)↔ B
✷↓ and iK4 ⊢ ✷. B✷↓ ↔ B✷.
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Lemma 7.3. For every (.)✷↓-substitution τ and every modal proposition A, we have iK4V ⊢ τ(A✷)↔
τ(A)✷ and iK4V ⊢ τ(A✷↓)↔ τ(A)✷↓.
Proof. First by induction on the complexity of B we show iK4V ⊢ τ(B✷) ↔ τ(B)✷. All cases are
easy, except for atomic B, which holds by existence of some C such that iK4V ⊢ τ(B) ↔ C✷↓ and
iK4 ⊢ ✷. C✷↓ ↔ C✷.
Then we use induction on the complexity of A to deduce the second assertion of this lemma. The
only non-trivial cases are atomic and boxed cases:
• A is atomic. Since iK4 ⊢ B✷↓ ↔ (B✷↓)✷↓ for every B, and iK4V ⊢ τ(A) ↔ B✷↓, we have the
desired result.
• A = ✷B. Easily deduced by iK4V ⊢ τ(B✷)↔ τ(B)✷.
✷
The following remark, will be helpful for later reductions of provability logics in section 8.
Remark 7.4. For every modal proposition A, GL ⊢ A (GLS ⊢ A) iff for every (.)✷↓-substitution τ
we have GLCa ⊢ τ(A) (GLSCa ⊢ τ(A)).
Proof. See [AM15, Lemmas. 3.1 and 3.3] . ✷
Lemma 7.5. For every A ∈ L✷,
• GLS ⊢ ✷A iff GL ⊢ A,
• GLSCa ⊢ ✷A iff GLCa ⊢ A.
Proof. The proof of second item is similar to the first one. Here we only treat the first item.
Obviously, GL ⊢ A implies GLS ⊢ ✷A. For a direct proof of the other way around, one may use of
Smory´nski’s operation. However, now that we enjoy the arithmetical soundness of PL(PA,N) = GLS,
from GLS ⊢ ✷A for every σ we have N |= σ
PA
(✷A) and hence PA ⊢ σ
PA
(A). From the arithmetical
completeness of GL = PL(PA,PA), we get GL ⊢ A. ✷
In the following theorem, we will show that GLSCa is the hardest provability logic among GL, GLCa,
GLS and GLSCa.
Theorem 7.6. We have the following reductions:
1. PL(PA,N) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA,N),
2. PL(PA,PA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA,PA).
Proof. We prove each item separately:
1. We must show that AC(GLS;PA,N) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (GLSCa;PA,N). Consider some A ∈ L✷. If GLS 0
A, by Remark 7.4, there exists some L✷-substitution τ such that GLSCa 0 τ(A). Let
f(A) :=
{
τ(A) : GLS 0 A
A : otherwise
Hence R1 (Definition 4.1) holds. Also let f¯
A
(σ) := σ
PA
◦ τ , which belongs to [[σ]]. Then obviously
R2 holds.
2. Similar to first item and left to the reader. ✷
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7.1 Reducing PL
Σ1
(PA,N) to PL
Σ1
(HA,N)
In this subsection, we illustrate how to reduce the arithmetical completeness of GLSCa to that of
iHσSP. First some definitions and lemmas:
Definition 7.7. For a modal proposition A let A‡ indicates the classically equivalent formula of
the form
A‡ :=
∧
i
Bi → Ci in which Bi =
∧
j
E
‡
i,j and Ci =
∨
j
F
‡
i,j
and Ei,j , Fi,j are atomic or boxed formulas. Also for atomic p we have p‡ = p and (✷E)
‡ = ✷(E‡).
Then define A† in this way:
• (.)† commutes with ∨,∧,→,
• p† = p for atomic p,
• (✷A)† = ✷A‡
Lemma 7.8. For every modal proposition A and arithmetical substitution α, we have
HA ⊢ α
HA
(A†)↔ α
PA
(A)
Proof. Easy and left to the reader. ✷
Lemma 7.9. For every A ∈ L✷, if iHσSP ⊢ A† then GLSCa ⊢ A.
Proof. Let GLSCa 0 A. Since in classical logic we have A ↔ A†, then GLSCa 0 A†. Hence by
AC
Σ1
(GLSCa;PA,N) from 7.1, we have some Σ1-substitution σ such that N 6|= σPA(A
†). Then
Lemma 7.8 implies N 6|= σ
HA
(A†), and hence by arithmetical soundness of iHσSP (Theorem 5.13)
we have iHσSP 0 A†, as desired. ✷
Lemma 7.10. For every A ∈ L✷, if iHσP ⊢ A† then GLCa ⊢ A.
Proof. Let GLCa 0 A. Since in classical logic we have A ↔ A†, then GLCa 0 A†. Hence by
ACΣ1 (GLCa;PA,PA) from 7.1, we have some Σ1-substitution σ such that PA 0 σPA(A
†). Then
Lemma 7.8 implies PA 0 σ
HA
(A†), and hence by arithmetical soundness of iHσP (Theorem 5.12) we
have iHσP 0 A†, as desired. ✷
Theorem 7.11. GLSCa = PLΣ1 (PA,N) ≤ PLΣ1 (HA,N) = iHσSP.
Proof. By Theorems 5.13 and 7.1 we have iHσSP = PLΣ1 (HA,N) and GLSCa = PLΣ1 (PA,N). For
the reduction, let f(A) := A† and f¯
A
as identity function.
R1. If iHσSP ⊢ A†, by Lemma 7.9 we have GLSCa ⊢ A.
R2. Holds by Lemma 7.8. ✷
7.2 Kripke Semantics
Let SucK or simply Suc, when no confusion is likely, indicates the set of all ❁-accessible nodes in
the Kripke model K.
Theorem 7.12. iGLP is sound and complete for semi-perfect Suc-classical ❁-branching Kripke
models.
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Proof. The soundness is easy and left to the reader. For the completeness, we first show the com-
pleteness for finite brilliant irreflexive transitive Suc-classical Kripke models. Let iGLP 0 A. Let
X := {B,¬B,B ∨ ¬B : B ∈ Sub(A)} ∪ {⊥}
and define the Kripke model K = (K,4,❁, V ) as follows:
• K is the family of all X-saturated sets with respect to iGLP.
• α 4 β iff α ⊆ β.
• α ❁ β iff β is a maximally consistent set and {B,✷B : ✷B ∈ α} ⊆ β and there is some
✷B ∈ β \ α.
It is straightforward to show that K is actually a finite brilliant irreflexive Suc-classical Kripke model,
and we leave all of them to the reader.
It is enough to show that K, α  B iff B ∈ α for every α ∈ K and B ∈ X . Then we may
use Lemma 3.37 and find some α such that K, α 1 A. We use induction on the complexity of
B ∈ X . All inductive steps are trivial, except for B = ✷C. If ✷C ∈ α and α ❁ β, then by
definition, C ∈ β and hence by induction hypothesis β  C. This implies α  ✷C. For the other
way around, let ✷C 6∈ α. Consider the set ∆ := {E,✷E : ✷E ∈ α}. If GL ⊢
∧
∆→ (✷C → C), then
iGL+✷PEM ⊢ ✷(
∧
∆)→ ✷C. Since iGLP ⊢ α→ ✷
∧
∆ and iGLP ⊢ ✷PEM, we have iGLP+α ⊢ ✷C
and hence ✷C ∈ α, a contradiction. Hence we have GL 0 (
∧
∆ ∧ ✷C) → C. Then by Lemma 3.37
there is some X-saturated set β ⊇ ∆ ∪ {✷C} ∪ {E ∨ ¬E : E ∈ Sub(A)} such that C 6∈ β. Hence
β ❂ α and β 1 C. Then α 1 ✷C, as desired.
Next we use the construction method [Iem01], to fulfil the other conditions: ❁-branching, neat
and tree. Let Kt := (Kt,4t,❁t, Vt) as follows:
• Kt is the set of all finite sequences of pairs r := 〈(α0, a0), . . . (αn, an)〉 such that for any i ≤ n:
(1) αi ∈ K, (2) ai ∈ {0, 1}, (3) for i < n either we have αi ≺ αi+1 or αi ❁ αi+1. Let f1(r)
and f2(r) indicate the left and right elements in the final element of the sequence r. In other
words, we let (f1(r), f2(r)) be the final element of the sequence r.
• r 4t s iff r is an initial segment of s and f1(r) 4 f1(s).
• r ❁t s iff r is an initial segment of s = 〈(α0, a0), . . . , (αn, an)〉, e.g. r = 〈(α0, a0), . . . , (αk, ak)〉
for some k < n and αi ❁ αi+1 for some k ≤ i < n.
• r Vt p iff f1(r)V p.
It is straightforward to show that Kt is semi-perfect ❁-branching Suc-classical Kripke model and for
every r ∈ Kt and formula B we have
Kt, r  B ⇐⇒ K, f(r)  B. ✷
Theorem 7.13. iGLPCa is sound and complete for semi-perfect Suc-classical atom-complete Kripke
models.
Proof. The proof is almost identical to the one for Theorem 7.12. We only explain the differences
here. Define
X := {B,¬B,B ∨ ¬B : B ∈ Sub(A)} ∪ {⊥} ∪ {✷p : p ∈ Sub(A) and p is atomic}
and K, the set of the nodes of Kripke model, is defined as the set of all X-saturated sets with respect
to iGLPCa. We show that every α ∈ K is atom-complete. Let p be an atomic variable such that
α  p. Hence p ∈ α which implies p ∈ Sub(A), and since iGLPCa ⊢ p → ✷p and α is closed under
deduction, we have ✷p ∈ α. Then α  ✷p and hence for every β ❂ α we have β  p, as desired. ✷
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7.3 Arithmetical Completeness
Theorem 7.14. iGLPCa is the relative Σ1-provability logic of PA in HA, i.e. PLΣ1 (PA,HA) =
iGLPCa.
Proof. The soundness is straightforward and left to the reader. For the completeness part, let
iGLPCa 0 A. Then by Theorem 7.13, there is some semi-perfect atom-complete Suc-classical Kripke
model K = (K,4,❁, V ) such that K, α0 1 A for some α0 ∈ K. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that K = (α0 4) ∪ (α0 ❁). Let K′ = (K ′,4′,❁′, V ′) indicates the Smory´nski’s extension of
K at α0 with the fresh node α1. For the simplicity of notations, we may use 4 and ❁ instead of 4′
and ❁′. Define the recursive function F as follows. Since K ′ is a finite set, we might assign a unique
number α¯ to each node α and speak about K ′ and its relationships 4 and ❁ inside the language of
arithmetic. For simplicity of notations, we may simply use α 4 β and α ❁ β corresponding to its
equivalent arithmetical formula.
Define F (0) := α1 and
F (n+ 1) :=


β : F (n) ❁ β and r(β, n + 1) < n+ 1 and (n)0 = β
β : F (n) ≺ β and F (n) 6❁ β and F (r(β, n + 1)) = α1
and r(β, n + 1) < r(F (n), n + 1) and (n)0 = β
F (n) : otherwise
in which L = β is shorthand for ∃x∀y ≥ x(F (y) = F (x)), (n)0 is the exponent of 2 in n and
r(α, n) := min
(
{x ∈ N : ∃ t ≤ nProof
PAx
(t, pL 6= αq)} ∪ {n}
)
Note that r(α, n) < n implies ✷+(L 6= α). F is a provably total recursive function in HA, i.e.
F (x) = y could be expressed as a Σ1-formula in the language of arithmetic and all of its expected
properties are provable in HA. Hence we may use the function symbol F in the language of arithmetic.
Define the arithmetical substitution σ(p) in this way:
σ(p) :=
∨
K,αp
∃xF (x) = α
Consider the triple I := (K∗,4∗, T ) as follows:
• K∗ := {α ∈ K : ∄β ∈ K(β ❁ α)}.
• α 4∗ β iff α 4 β for every α, β ∈ K∗. Again, by abuse of notations, we use 4 instead of 4∗.
• T (α) := PA+ (L = α).
By Theorem 3.24 and Lemma 7.16, we have some first-order Kripke model K∗ = (K∗,4,M)
such that K∗  HA and K∗, α |= T (α). By Lemma 3.21
(7.1) K∗, α  ∃xF (x) = β =⇒ β 4 α
Hence by Lemma 3.21, for every α ∈ K∗
(7.2) K∗, α  σPA (p) ⇐⇒ K, α  p
For every classical node α ∈ K∗, since the Kripke model above α is just a classical Kripke model,
one may repeat the Solovay’s argument and show that for every modal proposition B we have
(7.3)
{
K, α  B =⇒ PA ⊢ L = α→ σPA (B)
K, α 1 B =⇒ PA ⊢ L = α→ ¬σPA (B)
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We may use Lemmas 7.18 and 7.19 and eq. (7.2) to conclude
K∗, α  σPA (B) ⇐⇒ K, α  B
for every modal proposition B and α ∈ K∗. Since K, α0 1 A, we have K∗, α 1 σPA (A), and hence
HA 0 σPA (A), as desired. ✷
Lemma 7.15. For arbitrary α, β ∈ K ′ we have
1. PA ⊢ ∃xF (x) = α→
∨
α(4∪⊑)β L = β,
2. PA ⊢ L = α→ ¬✷+(L 6= β), for every α ❁ β,
3. PA ⊢ (L = α)✄ (L = β), for every α ≺ β,
4. N |= L = α1,
5. PA ⊢ L = α→ ✷+(L 6= α ∧ ∃xF (x) = α), for every α 6= α1.
Proof. All proofs are straightforward and left to the reader. ✷
Lemma 7.16. I, as defined in the proof of Theorem 7.14, is an I-frame (see Definition 3.23).
Proof. Use Theorem 3.22 and the items 2,3 and 4, of Lemma 7.15. ✷
Lemma 7.17. For every α ∈ K we have PA ⊢ L = α→ ✷+(
∨
α❁β L = β).
Proof. It is enough to show that PA ⊢ L = α→ ✷+(L 6= β) for every β < α such that β 6❂ α, holds.
Consider some β < α with β 6❂ β. If β = α, by item 5 in Lemma 7.15 we have the desired result.
So we may let β 6= α. We reason inside PA. Let L = α. Hence for some x we have F (x) = α. Then
we reason inside ✷+. By Σ1-completeness of PA (seeLemma 3.11), we have F (x) = α. Assume that
L = β. Let x0 be the first number such that F (x0) = β. Hence for some r such that ✷
+
r (L 6= β)
holds, we have F (r) = α1. Then r ≤ x and hence by Lemma 3.10 we may deduce L 6= β, in
contradiction with L = β. ✷
Lemma 7.18. For every α in K and proposition B we have
(7.4) K, α  ✷B =⇒ PA ⊢ L = α→ σPA (✷B)
Proof. Let K, α  ✷B. Hence for every β ❂ α we have K, β  B. Since every β ❂ α is classical,
by eq. (7.3) we have PA ⊢
∨
α❁β L = β → σPA (B). Hence PA ⊢ ✷
+(
∨
α❁β L = β) → σPA (✷B).
Lemma 7.17 implies PA ⊢ L = α→ σPA (✷B). ✷
Lemma 7.19. For every α in K and proposition B we have
(7.5) K, α 1 ✷B =⇒ PA ⊢ L = α→ ¬σPA (✷B)
Proof. Let K, α 1 ✷B. Hence for every β ❂ α we have K, β 1 B. Since every β ❂ α is classical,
by eq. (7.3) we have PA ⊢ L = β → ¬σPA (B). Hence PA ⊢ σPA (B) → L 6= β and then PA ⊢
✷
+σPA (B) → ✷+L 6= β and PA ⊢ ¬✷+L 6= β → ¬✷+σPA (B). Hence item 2 of Lemma 7.15 implies
PA ⊢ L = α→ ¬✷+σPA (B). ✷
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7.4 Reductions
Lemma 7.20. For every A ∈ L✷, if iHσ ⊢ A† then iGLPCa ⊢ A.
Proof. Let iGLPCa 0 A. Since in iK4 + ✷PEM we have A ↔ A†, then iGLPCa 0 A†. Hence by
AC
Σ1
(iGLPCa;PA,PA) from Theorem 7.14, we have some Σ1-substitution σ such that HA 0 σPA(A†).
Then Lemma 7.8 implies HA 0 σ
HA
(A†), and hence by arithmetical soundness of iHσ (Theorem 5.7)
we have iHσ 0 A†, as desired. ✷
Theorem 7.21. iGLPCa = PLΣ1 (PA,HA) ≤ PLΣ1 (HA,HA) = iHσ.
Proof. The soundness of iGLPCa is straightforward and left to the reader. Also by Theorem 5.7, we
have PLΣ1 (HA,HA) = iHσ. So, it is enough to show ACΣ1 (iGLPCa;PA,HA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iHσ;HA,HA).
Define f(A) := A† and f¯
A
as identity function.
R1. Use Lemma 7.20.
R2. Use Lemma 7.8. ✷
Theorem 7.22. GLCa = PLΣ1 (PA,PA) ≤ PLΣ1 (HA,PA) = iHσP.
Proof. We already have GLCa = PLΣ1 (PA,PA) and PLΣ1 (HA,PA) = iHσP by Theorems 5.12 and 7.1.
So, it is enough to show AC
Σ1
(GLCa;PA,PA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iHσP;HA,PA).
Define f(A) := A† and f¯
A
as identity function.
R1. Let iHσP ⊢ A†. By Lemma 7.20 we have GLCa ⊢ A.
R2. Use Lemma 7.8. ✷
The arithmetical completeness of iGLP will be reduced to the one for iGLPCa via the following
lemma. This argument is similar to the one explained in [AM15]. One may use a direct proof for the
arithmetical completeness of iGLP, similar to what we do for iGLPCa. However this is not enough
for our later use insection 8 of the arithmetical completeness of iGLP.
Lemma 7.23. For every modal proposition A, iGLP ⊢ A iff for every propositional modal (.)✷↓-
substitution τ (Definition 7.2) we have iGLPCa ⊢ τ(A).
Proof. One direction holds since iGLP is closed under substitutions and is included in iGLPCa. For
the other way around, let iGLP 0 A. By Theorem 7.12, there is some Suc-classical, semi-perfect
❁-branching Kripke model K = (K,4,❁, V ) such that K 1 A. For every α ∈ K, let p
α
be a fresh
atomic variable such that for every α 6= β we have p
α
6= p
β
. For every α ∈ K, define Aα via
induction on the ≺-height of α (the maximum number n such that a sequence α = α0 ≺ . . . ≺ αn
exists). So as induction hypothesis, let Aβ for every β ≻ α is defined.
A+α :=
∨
α≺β
Aβ , Aα := pα ∧
∧
α⊑β
✷¬✷. p
β
→ A+α
Let K¯ = (K,4,❁, V¯ ), in which α V¯ p iff p = p
β
for some β(4 ∪ ❁)α. Define
τ(p) :=
∨
K,αp
Aα
Then by induction on the complexity of the modal proposition B, we show
K, α  B ⇐⇒ K¯, α  τ(B)
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• B is atomic variable: For every α ∈ K such that K, α  B, by Lemma 7.24 we have K¯, α  Aα and
hence K¯, α  τ(p). Also if K¯, α  τ(B), then for some β ∈ K we have K, β  B and K¯, α  Aβ .
Hence by Lemma 7.24 we have β 4 α, which implies K, α  B, as desired.
• All the other cases are trivial and left to the reader.
Then we have K¯ 1 τ(A). Obviously the Kripke model K¯ inherits all properties from K and moreover
it is atom-complete. Hence by soundness part of the Theorem 7.13, iGLPCa 0 τ(A), as desired. ✷
Lemma 7.24. Let K¯ and Aα, as defined in the proof of Lemma 7.23. For every α, β ∈ K we have
K¯, α  Aβ iff α < β.
Proof. We use induction on the ≺-height of β. As induction hypothesis, let for every β ≻ β0 and
α ∈ K we have K¯, α  Aβ iff β < α. Note that by induction hypothesis we have K¯, β  A
+
β0
iff
β ≻ β0.
• (α < β0 implies K¯, α  Aβ0): It is enough to show that K¯, β0  Aβ0 . Then for evey α < β0 we
have K¯, α  Aβ0 , as desired. By definition of K¯, we have K¯, β0  pβ0 . Consider some γ ⊒ β0.
Again by definition of K¯, we have K¯, β0 1 ✷¬pγ and for every δ ≻ β0 we have K¯, δ  A
+
β0
. Hence
K¯, β0  ✷¬pγ → A
+
β0
. This argument shows that K¯, β0  Aβ0 , as desired.
• (K¯, α  Aβ0 implies α < β0): Let K¯, α  Aβ0 . Since K¯, α  pβ0 , we have β0(4 ∪ ❁)α. If β0 4 α,
we are done. So let β0 64 α and β0 ❁ α. Hence for arbitrary γ ⊒ β0 we have K¯, α  ¬✷¬pγ . This
by Suc-classicality, implies that there is some δ ❂ α such that K¯, δ  p
γ
. Then we have γ(4 ∪ ❁)δ.
By Suc-classicality, we have γ ⊑ δ. Since K¯ is with tree frame, we have either α ⊑ γ or γ ⊑ α.
On the other hand, since K¯ is ❁-branching, there must be some γ ❂ β0 which is ❁-incomparable
with α, a contradiction with our previous argument. ✷
Theorem 7.25. iGLP = PL(PA,HA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA,HA) = iGLPCa.
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLP is straightforward and left to the reader. Also by Theo-
rem 7.21 we have PL
Σ1
(PA,HA) = iGLPCa. It remains to show
AC(iGLP;PA,HA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLP;PA,HA)
Let A ∈ L✷ such that iGLP 0 A. Then by Lemma 7.23 there is some substitution τ such that
iGLPCa 0 τ(A). Define the function f as follows:
f(A) :=
{
τ(A) : iGLP 0 A
whatever you like : otherwise
Also let f¯
A
(σ) := σ
PA
◦ τ . Then one may easily observe that R0, R1 and R3 holds for this f, f¯ . ✷
Lemma 7.26. For A ∈ L✷, if iGLPCa ⊢ A¬↑ then GLCa ⊢ A.
Proof. Let iGLPCa ⊢ A¬↑. Then GLCa ⊢ A¬↑ and since A¬↑ is classically equivalent to A we have
GLCa ⊢ A. ✷
Theorem 7.27. GLCa = PLΣ1 (PA,PA) ≤ PLΣ1 (PA,HA) = iGLPCa.
Proof. By Theorems 7.1 and 7.21 we have GLCa = PLΣ1 (PA,PA) and PLΣ1 (PA,HA) = iGLPCa. We
must show AC
Σ1
(GLCa;PA,PA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLPCa;PA,HA). Given A ∈ L✷, define f(A) := A
¬↑
and f¯
A
as identity function.
R1. If iGLPCa ⊢ A¬↑, then by Lemma 7.26 we have GLCa ⊢ A.
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R2. Holds by Lemmas 5.15 and 5.18. ✷
Theorem 7.28. iGLPCa = PLΣ1 (PA,HA) ≤ PLΣ1 (PA,N) = GLSCa.
Proof. By Theorems 7.1 and 7.25 we have PL
Σ1
(PA,N) = GLSCa and iGLPCa = PLΣ1 (PA,HA). We
must show AC
Σ1
(iGLP;PA,HA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (GLSCa;PA,N). Given A ∈ L✷, define f(A) = ✷A and
f¯
A
as identity function.
R1. Let GLSCa ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of iHσSP = PLΣ1 (HA,N), for every Σ1-substitution σ we have
N |= σ
HA
(✷A) and hence HA ⊢ σ
HA
(A). Then by arithmetical completeness of PL
Σ1
(HA,HA),
we have iHσ ⊢ A.
One also may prove this item with a direct propositional argument. For simplicity reasons, we
chose the indirect way.
R2. Let N 6|= σ
HA
(✷A). Then HA 0 σ
HA
(A), as desired. ✷
Theorem 7.29. GLCa = PLΣ1 (PA,PA) ≤ PLΣ1 (PA,N) = GLSCa.
Proof. By Theorem 7.1 we have GLCa = PLΣ1 (PA,PA) and PLΣ1 (PA,N) = GLSCa. We must show
ACΣ1 (GLCa;PA,PA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (GLSCa;PA,N). Given A ∈ L✷, define f(A) = ✷A and f¯A as identity
function.
R1. Let GLSCa ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of GLSCa = PLΣ1 (PA,N), for every Σ1-substitution σ we have
N |= σ
PA
(✷A) and hence PA ⊢ σ
PA
(A). Then by arithmetical completeness of PL
Σ1
(PA,PA),
we have GLCa ⊢ A.
One also may prove this item with a direct propositional argument, using Kripke semantics.
For simplicity reasons, we chose the indirect way.
R2. Let N 6|= σ
PA
(✷A). Then PA 0 σ
PA
(A), as desired. ✷
Theorem 7.30. GL = PL
Σ1
(PA,PA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA,N) = GLS.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7.29 and left to the reader. ✷
8 Relative provability logics for PA∗
In this section, we characterize several relative provability logics for PA∗ via reductions. All reduc-
tions are shown at once in the diagram 4. The head of arrow reduces to its tail, via some simple
reduction (section 4.1). The translation f in the reduction, is shown over the arrow lines and the
number which appears under arrow, is the corresponding theorem.
8.1 Kripke Semantics
In the following lemma, we will show that the axioms CP and TP are local over iGL, i.e. whenever
we can deduce some proposition A from CP+ TP in iGL, then we may deduce it by those instances
of CP and TP which use the subformulas of A:
Lemma 8.1. For every A, if iGLCT ⊢ A then
iGL ⊢ ✷.

 ∧
E→F∈sub(A)
✷(E → F )→ (E ∨ (E → F )) ∧
∧
E∈sub(A)
(E → ✷E)

→ A
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∗,N)
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Σ1
(PA,HA) PL
Σ1
(PA,PA) PLΣ1 (PA,N)
8.25τ 8.27τ
8.33
✷(.)
8.30τ 8.32τ
8.16(.)✷↓
8.19
(.)¬↑
8.14(.)✷↓
8.21
(.)✷↑
8.23
✷(.)
8.18(.)✷↓
✷(.)
7.29
(.)¬↑
7.27
Diagram 4: Reductions for relative provability logics of PA∗
Proof. For the simplicity of notations, in this proof, let
ϕ := ✷.
∧
E→F∈sub(A)
✷(E → F )→ (E ∨ (E → F )) ∧ ✷.
∧
E∈sub(A)
(E → ✷E)
and ⊢ indicates derivablity in iGL+ ϕ.
One side is trivial. For the other way around, assume that iGL 0 ϕ → A. We will construct some
finite Kripke model K = (K,❁,4, V ) with ❁=≺ such that K, α 1 A, which by soundness of iGLCT
for finite Kripke models with ≺=❁, we have the desired result. The proof is almost identical to the
proof of Theorem 3.38 in [AM18, Theorem 4.26]. To be self-contained, we elaborate it here.
Let Sub(A) be the set of sub-formulae of A. Then define
X := {B,✷B | B ∈ Sub(A)}
It is obvious that X is a finite adequate set. We define K = (K,4,❁, V ) as follows. Define
• K as the set of all X-saturated sets with respect to iGL+ ϕ,
• α ❁ β iff {D : ✷D ∈ α} ⊆ β and α $ β,
• α 4 β iff α ❁ β or α = β,
• αV p iff p ∈ α, for atomic p.
K trivially satisfies all the properties of finite Kripke model with ❁=≺. So we must only show
that K 1 A. To this end, we first show by induction on B ∈ X that B ∈ α iff α  B, for each
α ∈ K. The only non-trivial cases are B = ✷C and B = E → F .
• B = ✷C: Let ✷C 6∈ α. We must show α 1 ✷C. The other direction is easier to prove and
we leave it to reader. Let β0 := {D ∈ X | α ⊢ ✷D}. If β0,✷C ⊢ C, since by definition of β0,
we have α ⊢ ✷β0 and hence by Lo¨b’s axiom, α ⊢ ✷C, which is in contradiction with ✷C 6∈ α.
Hence β0,✷C 0 C and so there exists some X-saturated set β such that β 0 C, β ⊇ β0∪{✷C}.
Hence β ∈ K and α ❁ β. Then by the induction hypothesis, β 1 C and hence α 1 ✷C.
35
• Let E → F 6∈ α. Then F 6∈ α. If E ∈ α, by induction hypothesis we have α  E and α 1 F ,
and hence α 1 E → F , as desired. So we may let E 6∈ α. Define β0 := {D : ✷D ∈ α}.
If α ⊢
∧
β0 → (E → F ), then α ⊢ ✷(E → F ) and hence by TP, either we have α ⊢ E or
α ⊢ E → F , a contradiction. So we may let α 0
∧
β0 → (E → F ), and use Lemma 3.37 to
find β ⊇ β0 ∪ α∪ {E} as some X-saturated node in K. Hence α ❁ β which implies α ≺ β and
by induction hypothesis β  E and β 1 F , which implies α 1 E → F , as desired.
Since iGL+ ϕ 0 A, by Lemma 3.37, there exists some X-saturated set α ∈ K such that α 0 A, and
hence by the above argument we have α 1 A. ✷
Lemma 8.2. For arbitrary proposition A
iGLCT ⊢ A✷ implies iGL+✷CP+ TP ⊢ A✷.
Proof. Let iGLCT ⊢ A✷. Hence by Lemma 8.1 the following is derivable in iGL
✷.
G︷ ︸︸ ︷∧
B∈sub(A✷)
B → ✷B ∧✷.
H︷ ︸︸ ︷∧
E→F∈sub(A✷)
✷(E → F )→ (E ∨ (E → F ))

→ A✷
Hence by Lemma 3.7 iGL ⊢ G✷↑ ∧H✷↑ → A✷. By Lemma 3.8, iK4 ⊢ G✷↑. Also (✷G)✷↑ = ✷G which
is an instance of ✷CP. Let us consider some arbitrary conjunct ✷(E → F )→ (E ∨ (E → F )) in H .
Since E → F is a subformula of A✷, we have E = E✷0 and F = F
✷
0 . Hence inside iK4, the H
✷↑ is
equivalent to some instance of TP. Hence iGL+✷CP+ TP ⊢ A✷. ✷
Theorem 8.3. iGLCT is sound and complete for semi-perfect Suc-quasi-classical Kripke models.
Proof. The soundness is easy and left to the reader. For the completeness, we first show the com-
pleteness for finite brilliant irreflexive transitive Suc-quasi-classical Kripke models. Let iGLCT 0 A.
Let
X := {B,✷B : B ∈ Sub(A)}
and define the Kripke model K = (K,4,❁, V ) as follows:
• K is the family of all X-saturated sets with respect to iGLCT.
• α ❁ β iff α 6= β and {B,✷B : ✷B ∈ α} ⊆ β and β is X-saturated with respect to iGLCT.
• α ≺ β iff α $ β and either α ❁ β or γ 6❁ α, for every γ ∈ K.
• αV p iff p ∈ α.
It is straightforward to show that K is a finite brilliant irreflexive transitive Suc-quasi-classical
Kripke model. We leave them to the reader. We only show that K, α  B iff B ∈ α for every α ∈ K
and B ∈ X . Then by Lemma 3.37 one may find some α ∈ K such that K, α 1 A, as desired.
Use induction on the complexity of B ∈ X . All inductive steps are trivial, except for:
• B = ✷C: If ✷C ∈ α and α ❁ β, then by definition, C ∈ β and hence by induction hypothesis
β  C. This implies α  ✷C. For the other way around, let ✷C 6∈ α. Consider the set
∆ := {E,✷E : ✷E ∈ α}. If iGLCT ⊢
∧
∆ → (✷C → C), then iGLCT ⊢ ✷(
∧
∆) → ✷C. Since
iK4+α ⊢ ✷(
∧
∆), we may deduce iGLCT+α ⊢ ✷C, a contradiction. Hence iGLCT 0 (
∧
∆∧✷C)→
C. By Lemma 3.37, there exists some X-saturated set β ⊇ ∆∪{✷C} with respect to iGLCT such
that C 6∈ β. Hence β ∈ K and α ❁ β and C 6∈ β. Induction hypothesis implies that β 1 C and
hence α 1 ✷C.
• B = C → D: If C → D ∈ α and α 4 β and β  C, by induction hypothesis C ∈ β and hence
D ∈ β. Again by induction hypothesis we have β  D. This shows that α  C → D. For the
other way around, let C → D 6∈ α. We have two cases:
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– There is some γ ❁ α: Hence α is X-sturated w.r.t iGLCT. Let ∆ := {E : ✷E ∈ α}. We have
tow subcases:
∗ If iGLCT + ∆ + α ⊢ C → D, then iGLCT + ✷α + ✷∆ ⊢ ✷(C → D). By the completeness
principle, we have iGLCT+α ⊢ ✷(C → D). By TP we have iGLCT+α ⊢ C ∨ (C → D). Since
α is X-saturated with respect to iGLCT, we have either C ∈ α or C → D ∈ α. The latter is
impossible, hence C ∈ α. Again by X-saturatedness of α, we can deduce D 6∈ α. Hence by
induction hypothesis we have α  C and α 1 D, which implies α 1 C → D, as desired.
∗ If iGLCT+∆+α 0 C → D, then by Lemma 3.37 there exists someX-saturated β ⊇ α∪∆∪{C}
w.r.t iGLCT (and a fortiori iGLCT) such that D 6∈ β. Induction hypothesis implies β  C and
β 1 D. One may observe that α ≺ β or α = β, and hence α 1 C → D, as desired.
– There is no γ ❁ α: since iGLCT + α 0 C → D, by Lemma 3.37, there exists some X-saturate
set β ⊇ α∪ {C} with respect to iGLCT such that D 6∈ β. Hence by induction hypothesis β  C
and β 1 D. One may observe that β < α and hence α 1 C → D.
Next we use the construction method [Iem01] to fulfil the other conditions: being neat and tree.
Let Kt := (Kt,4t,❁t, Vt) as follows:
• Kt is the set of all finite sequences r := 〈α0, . . . αn〉 such that for any i < n either we have
αi ≺ αi+1 or αi ❁ αi+1. Let f(r) indicates the final element of the sequence r.
• r 4t s iff r is an initial segment of s and f(r) 4 f(s).
• r ❁t s iff r is an initial segment of s = 〈α0, . . . αn〉, e.g. r = 〈α0, . . . αk〉 for some k < n and
αi ❁ αi+1 for some k ≤ i < n.
• r Vt p iff f(r)V p.
It is straightforward to show that Kt is semi-perfect Suc-quasi-classical Kripke model and for every
r ∈ Kt and formula B we have
Kt, r  B ⇐⇒ K, f(r)  B. ✷
Theorem 8.4. iGLCTCa is sound and complete for semi-perfect Suc-quasi-classical atom-complete
Kripke models.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 8.3 and left to the reader. ✷
Theorem 8.5. For every proposition A, we have iGLCTP ⊢ A iff for every quasi-classical perfect
Kripke model K and every boolean interpretation I and arbitrary node α in K we have K, α, I |= A.
Proof. The soundness is easy and left to the reader. For the completeness part, let iGLCTP 0 A.
Let A′ be a boolean equivalent of A which is a conjunction of implications E → F in which E
is a conjunction of a set of atomics or boxed propositions and F is a disjunction of atomics or
boxed proposition. Evidently such A′ exists for every A. Hence iGLCTP 0 A′. Then there must be
some conjunct E → F of A′ such that iGLCTP 0 E → F , E is a conjunction of atomic and boxed
propositions and F is a disjunction of atomic and boxed propositions. Let XE be the set of atomic
conjuncts in E and XF the set of atomic disjuncts in F . Note here that XE and XF are disjoint
sets. Define E¯ and F¯ as the replacement of XE and XF by ⊤ and ⊥ in E and F , respectively.
Hence E¯ → F¯ , does not have any outer atomics and then (E¯ → F¯ )✷ is equivalent in iGL+✷CP with
E¯ → F¯ . Then iGL + TP + ✷CP 0 (E → F )✷ and by Lemma 8.2 we have iGLCT 0 E¯ → F¯ . Then
by Theorem 3.38, there is some perfect, quasi-classical Kripke model K such that K, α 1 E¯ → F¯ .
Hence there is some β < α such that K, β  E¯ and K, β 1 F¯ . Let the boolean interpretation I
defined such that:
I(p) :=


true : p ∈ XE
false : p ∈ XF
no matter, true or false : otherwise
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One may observe that K, β, I 6|= E → F and hence K, β, I 6|= A. ✷
Theorem 8.6. For every proposition A, we have iGLCTPCa ⊢ A iff for every quasi-classical perfect
Kripke model K and arbitrary node α in K we have K, α |= A.
Proof. The proof is very similar to the one for Theorem 8.5, except for the argument for XE and
XF and E¯ and F¯ and the boolean interpretation I, which are unnecessary here with the presence
of the CPa. For readability reasons, we bring the adapted proof here.
The soundness is straightforward and left to the reader. For the completeness, let iGLCTPCa 0 A.
Let A′ be a boolean equivalent of A which is a conjunction of implications E → F in which E is
a conjunction of a set of atomics or boxed propositions and F is a disjunction of atomics or boxed
proposition. Evidently such A′ exists for every A. Hence iGLCTPCa 0 A′. Then there must be
some conjunct E → F of A′ such that iGLCTP 0 E → F , E is a conjunction of atomic and boxed
propositions and F is a disjunction of atomic and boxed propositions. Hence E✷ → F✷ is equivalent
in iK4+ CPa +✷CP with E → F . Then iGL+TP+✷CP+ CPa 0 (E → F )✷ and by Lemma 8.2 we
have iGLCT 0 E → F . Then by Theorem 3.38, there is some perfect, quasi-classical Kripke model
K such that K, α 1 E → F . Hence there is some β < α such that K, β  E and K, β 1 F . Then
K, β 6|= E → F and hence K, β 6|= A. ✷
Theorem 8.7. iGLCTS∗P ⊢ A✷↓ iff for every quasi-classical perfect Kripke model K and every
boolean interpretation I and arbitrary A✷↓-sound node α in K we have K, α, I |= A✷↓.
Proof. Both directions are proved contra-positively. For the soundness part, assume that K, α, I 6|=
A✷↓ for some boolean interpretation I and quasi-classical perfect Kripke model K := (K,4,❁, V )
which is A✷↓-sound at α ∈ K. Since derivability is finite, it is enough to show that for every finite
set Γ of modal propositions we have
iGLCTP 0
∧
B∈Γ
(✷B✷ → B✷)→ A✷↓.
By Theorem 8.5 and Lemma 3.43, it is enough to find some number i such that
K(i), αi, I 6|=
∧
B∈Γ
(✷B✷ → B✷)→ A✷↓.
Let us define ni and mi as the number of propositions in the sets Ni := {B ∈ Γ : K
(i), αi, I |=
B✷ ∧ ✷B✷} and Mi := {B ∈ Γ : K(i), αi, I |= ✷B✷ ∧ ¬B✷}, respectively. We use induction on k
and prove the following statement:
ϕ(k) := for every i, if ni < k then there is some 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 + ni such that
K(i+j), αi+j , I |=
∧
B∈Γ
(✷B✷ → B✷)(8.1)
Then by ϕ(n0 + 1), one may find some number j such that Kj , αj , I |=
∧
B∈Γ(✷B
✷ → B✷), and by
Lemma 3.43 we also have Kj , αj , I 6|= A✷↓, as desired.
ϕ(0) trivially holds. As induction hypothesis, let ϕ(k) holds and show that ϕ(k + 1) holds as
follows. Let some number i such that ni < k + 1. If ni < k, by induction hypothesis we have the
desired conclusion. So let ni = k. If mi = 0, we may let j = 0 and we have eq. (8.1). So let B ∈ Γ
such that K(i), αi, I |= ✷B✷ ∧ ¬B✷. We have two sub-cases:
• mi+1 = 0: observe in this case that eq. (8.1) holds for j = 1.
• mi+1 > 0: in this case we have ni+1 < k and hence by application of the induction hypothesis
with i := i + 1, we get some 0 ≤ j′ ≤ 1 + ni+1 such that K
(i+1+j′), αi+1+j′ |=
∧
B∈Γ(✷B
✷ →
B✷). Hence if we let j := j′ + 1 we have 0 ≤ j ≤ 1 + ni and eq. (8.1), as desired.
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For the completeness part, assume that iGLCTS∗P 0 A✷↓. Hence
iGLCTP 0

 ∧
✷B✷∈Sub(A✷↓)
(✷B✷ → B✷)

→ A✷↓
Hence Theorem 8.5 implies the desired result. ✷
Theorem 8.8. iGLCTS∗PCa ⊢ A✷↓ iff for every quasi-classical perfect Kripke model K and arbitrary
A-sound node α in K we have K, α |= A.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for Theorem 8.7. One must use Theorem 8.6 instead of
Theorem 8.5 in the proof. ✷
8.2 Reductions
Lemma 8.9. iGLCT ⊢ A implies GL ⊢ A✷.
Proof. Use induction on the proof iGLCT ⊢ A. ✷
Lemma 8.10. GL ⊢ A implies iGLP ⊢ ✷A.
Proof. Let GL ⊢ A. Hence iGL ⊢ ✷. PEM → A. Since necessitation is admissible to iGL, we have
iGL ⊢ ✷PEM→ ✷A which implies iGLP ⊢ ✷A. ✷
Definition 8.11. For a Kripke model K = (K,4,❁, V ), let K˜, indicates the Kripke model derived
from K by making every ❁-accessible node as a classical node. More precisely, we define K˜ :=
(K, 4˜,❁, V )) in this way:
α4˜β iff “α is not ❁-accessible (α 6∈ Suc) and α 4 β” or
“α is ❁-accessible (α 6∈ Suc) and α = β”
Lemma 8.12. For every Suc-quasi-classical semi-perfect Kripke model K = (K,4,❁, V ) and α 6∈
Suc and arbitrary proposition A we have
K, α  A✷↓ ⇐⇒ K˜, α  A✷↓.
Proof. First observe that for every α ∈ Suc and every proposition B we have
K˜, α  B ⇐⇒ K˜, α |=c B ⇐⇒ K, α |=c B
Then we may use Corollary 3.41 and for α ∈ Suc deduce
(8.2) K, α  B✷ ⇐⇒ K˜, α  B✷.
We use induction on the complexity of A and prove the assertion of the lemma. All cases are obvious
except for the cases A = ✷B in which we have A✷↓ = ✷B✷. We have
K, α 1 ✷B✷ ⇐⇒ there exists some β ❂ α such that K, β 1 B✷
⇐⇒ there exists some β ❂ α such that K˜, β 1 B✷
⇐⇒ K˜, α 1 ✷B✷
in which in the second line we use eq. (8.2). ✷
Lemma 8.13. For every A ∈ L✷ we have iGLCTPCa ⊢ A iff GLCa ⊢ A✷↓.
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Proof. We use induction on the proof iGLCTPCa ⊢ A and show GLCa ⊢ A✷↓. All cases are similar to
the one for iGLCTP, except for
• A = p→ ✷p: then iK4 ⊢ A✷↓ ↔ A and hence GLCa ⊢ A✷↓.
For the other way around, let iGLCTPCa 0 A. Then by ✷CP we have A✷↓ ↔ A, and then we may
deduce iGLCTPCa 0 A✷↓. By Theorem 8.6, there exists some quasi-classical perfect Kripke model K
such that K, α 6|= A✷↓. Corollary 3.41 implies K, α 6|=c A✷↓, which by soundness of GLCa for classical
Kripke models with the property of truth-ascending (i.e. if p is true at some node, then it is true
also at all accessible nodes), implies GLCa 0 A✷↓. ✷
Theorem 8.14. iGLCTPCa = PLΣ1 (PA
∗,PA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA,PA) = GLCa.
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCTPCa is straightforward and left to the reader. Also
GLCa = PLΣ1 (PA,PA) holds by Theorem 7.1. It is enough here to show that
AC
Σ1
(iGLCTCa;PA
∗,PA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (GLCa;PA,PA).
Given A ∈ L✷, let f(A) := (A)
✷↓ and f¯
A
as identity function.
R1. Lemma 8.13.
R2. If PA 0 σ
PA
(A✷↓), for a Σ1-substitution σ, then by Lemma 3.20 we have PA 0 σPA∗ (A). ✷
Lemma 8.15. For every A ∈ L✷ we have iGLCTCa ⊢ A iff iGLPCa ⊢ A✷↓.
Proof. We use induction on the proof iGLCTCa ⊢ A and show iGLPCa ⊢ A✷↓. All cases are identical
to the corresponding on in the previous proof, except for when A = p→ ✷p, which trivially we have
iGLPCa ⊢ A✷↓.
For the other way around, let iGLCTCa 0 A. Then by Lemma 3.6 we have A✷↓ ↔ A, and
hence iGLCTCa 0 A✷↓. By Theorem 8.4, there exists some Suc-quasi-classical semi-perfect atom-
complete Kripke model K such that K, α 1 A✷↓, for some node α. We may assume α 6∈ Suc,
otherwise eliminate all nodes not in (α 4) ∪ (α ❁) and consider this new Kripke model instead of
K. Obviously the new Kripke model still refutes A✷↓ at α and is Suc-quasi-classical semi-perfect
and atom-complete. Hence Lemma 8.12 implies that K˜, α 1 A✷↓, in which K˜ indicates the Kripke
model derived from K by making every ❁-accessible node as a classical node. Precise definition of K˜
came before Lemma 8.12. It is obvious that K˜ is a Suc-classical semi-perfect atom-complete Kripke
model. Hence Theorem 7.13 implies iGLPCa 0 A✷↓, as desired. ✷
Theorem 8.16. iGLCTCa = PLΣ1 (PA
∗,HA) ≤ PLΣ1 (PA,HA) = iGLPCa.
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCTCa is straightforward and left to the reader. Also
iGLPCa = PLΣ1 (PA,HA) holds by Theorem 7.14. It is enough here to show that
AC
Σ1
(iGLCTCa;PA
∗,HA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLPCa;PA,HA).
Given A ∈ L✷, let f(A) := (A)✷↓ and f¯A as identity function.
R1. Lemma 8.15.
R2. If HA 0 σ
PA
(A✷↓), for a Σ1-substitution σ, then by Lemma 3.20 we have HA 0 σPA∗ (A). ✷
Lemma 8.17. For every A ∈ L✷ we have iGLCTS∗PCa ⊢ A iff GLSCa ⊢ A✷↓.
Proof. We use induction on the proof iGLCTS∗PCa ⊢ A and show GLSCa ⊢ A✷↓. All cases are similar
to the one for iGLCTS∗P, except for
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• A = p→ ✷p: then iK4 ⊢ A✷↓ ↔ A and hence GLCa ⊢ A✷↓.
For the other way around, let iGLCTS∗PCa 0 A. Then by ✷CP we have A✷↓ ↔ A, and then we may
deduce iGLCTS∗PCa 0 A✷↓. By Theorem 8.8, there exists some quasi-classical perfect Kripke model
K such that K, α 6|= A✷↓ and K is A✷↓-sound at α. Corollary 3.41 implies K, α 6|=c A✷↓, which by
soundness of GLSCa for classical Kripke models with the property of truth-ascending (i.e. if p is true
at some node, then it is true also at all accessible nodes), implies GLSCa 0 A✷↓. ✷
Theorem 8.18. iGLCTS∗PCa = PLΣ1 (PA
∗,N) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA,N) = GLSCa.
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCTS∗PCa is straightforward and left to the reader. Also
PL
Σ1
(PA,N) = GLSCa holds by Theorem 7.1. It is enough here to show that
ACΣ1 (iGLCTS
∗PCa;PA
∗,N) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (GLSCa;PA,N).
Given A ∈ L✷, let f(A) := (A)✷↓ and f¯A as identity function.
R1. Lemma 8.17.
R2. If N 6|= σ
PA
(A✷↓), for a Σ1-substitution σ, then by Lemma 3.20 we have N 6|= σPA∗ (A). ✷
Theorem 8.19. iGLCTPCa = PLΣ1 (PA
∗,PA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA∗,HA) = iGLCTCa.
Proof. We already have PL
Σ1
(PA∗,PA) = iGLCTPCa and iGLCTPCa = PLΣ1 (PA
∗,PA) by Theo-
rems 8.14 and 8.16. It is enough here to show thatAC
Σ1
(iGLCTPCa;PA
∗,PA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLCTCa;PA
∗,HA).
Given A ∈ L✷, let f(A) := (A)¬↑ and f¯A as identity function.
R1. If iGLCTCa ⊢ A¬↑ then iGLCTPCa ⊢ A¬↑, and since we have PEM in iGLCTPCa, we may
conclude iGLCTPCa ⊢ A.
R2. If HA 0 σ
PA∗
(A¬↑), for a Σ1-substitution σ, then by Lemma 5.18 we have HA 0 (σPA∗ (A))
¬.
Hence by Lemma 5.15 we have PA 0 σ
PA∗
(A). ✷
Lemma 8.20. For every A ∈ L✷, if iGLCTPCa ⊢ A✷↑, then iGLCT ⊢ A.
Proof. Let iGLCT 0 A. Hence by Theorem 3.38, there is some perfect quasi-classical Kripke model K
such that K, α 1 A. Then Corollary 3.42 implies K, α 6|= A✷↑, and hence by soundness of iGLCTPCa
(Theorem 8.6) implies iGLCTPCa 0 A✷↑. ✷
Theorem 8.21. iGLCT = PLΣ1 (PA
∗,PA∗) ≤ PLΣ1 (PA
∗,PA) = iGLCTPCa.
Proof. The soundness of iGLCT is straightforward and left to the reader. By Theorem 8.14 we have
PL
Σ1
(PA∗,PA) = iGLCTPCa. We must showACΣ1 (iGLCT;PA
∗,PA∗) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLCTPCa;PA
∗,PA).
Given A ∈ L✷, define f(A) = A✷↑ and f¯A as identity function.
R1. Lemma 8.20.
R2. Let PA 0 σ
PA∗
(A✷↑). Then by Lemma 3.17, PA 0 σ
PA∗
(A)PA, and hence by definition of PA∗,
we have PA∗ 0 σ
PA∗
(A). ✷
Corollary 8.22. For every A ∈ L✷, we have iGLCT ⊢ A iff iGLCTPCa ⊢ A✷↑.
Proof. Use Corollary 4.5 and theorem 8.21. ✷
Theorem 8.23. iGLCT = PL
Σ1
(PA∗,PA∗) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA∗,N) = iGLCTS∗PCa.
Proof. By Theorems 8.18 and 8.21 we have PL
Σ1
(PA∗,N) = iGLCTS∗PCa and PLΣ1 (PA
∗,PA∗) =
iGLCT. We must show AC
Σ1
(iGLCT;PA∗,PA∗) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLCTS
∗PCa;PA
∗,N). Given A ∈ L✷,
define f(A) = ✷A and f¯
A
as identity function.
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R1. Let iGLCTS∗PCa ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of iGLCTS∗PCa = PLΣ1 (PA
∗,N), for every Σ1-substitution
σ we have N |= σ
PA∗
(✷A) and hence PA∗ ⊢ σ
PA∗
(A). Then by arithmetical completeness of
iGLCT = PL
Σ1
(PA∗,PA∗), we have iGLCT ⊢ A.
One also may prove this item with a direct propositional argument, using Kripke semantics.
For simplicity reasons, we chose the indirect way.
R2. Let N 6|= σ
PA∗
(✷A). Then PA∗ 0 σ
PA∗
(A), as desired. ✷
Lemma 8.24. For every A ∈ L✷, we have iGLCT ⊢ A iff iGLP ⊢ A✷↓.
Proof. We use induction on the proof iGLCT ⊢ A and show iGLP ⊢ A✷↓:
• iGL ⊢ A: by Lemma 3.7 we have iGL ⊢ A✷↓.
• A is an axiom instance of ✷CP or ✷TP: Then A = ✷B and iGLCT ⊢ B and by Lemma 8.9 we
have GL ⊢ B✷. By Lemma 8.10 we have iGLP ⊢ ✷B✷.
• iGLCT ⊢ B and iGLCT ⊢ B → A with lower proof length: by induction hypothesis we have
iGLP ⊢ B✷↓ and iGLP ⊢ B✷↓ → A✷↓, which implies iGLP ⊢ A✷↓, as desired.
For the other way around, let iGLCT 0 A. Then by Lemma 3.6 we have A✷↓ ↔ A, and hence
iGLCT 0 A✷↓. By Theorem 8.3, there exists some Suc-quasi-classical semi-perfect Kripke model K
such that K, α 1 A✷↓, for some node α. We may let α 6∈ Suc, otherwise eliminate all nodes not
in (α 4) ∪ (α ❁) and consider this new Kripke model instead of K. Obviously the new Kripke
model still refutes A✷↓ at α and is Suc-quasi-classical semi-perfect. Hence Lemma 8.12 implies that
K˜, α 1 A✷↓, in which K˜ indicates the Kripke model derived from K by making every ❁-accessible
node as a classical node. Precise definition of K˜ came before Lemma 8.12. It is obvious that K˜ is a
Suc-classical semi-perfect Kripke model. Hence Theorem 7.12 implies iGLP 0 A✷↓, as desired. ✷
Theorem 8.25. iGLCT = PL(PA∗,HA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA∗,HA) = iGLCTCa.
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCTCa is straightforward and left to the reader. By Theo-
rem 8.16 we have PL(PA∗,HA) = iGLCTCa. We must show
AC(iGLCT;PA∗,HA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLCTCa;PA
∗,HA).
Given A ∈ L✷, if iGLCT ⊢ A, define f(A) := ⊤. If iGLCT 0 A, by Lemma 8.24 we have iGLP 0 A✷↓,
and hence by Lemma 7.23 there exists some propositional (.)✷↓-substitution τ such that iGLPCa 0
τ(A✷↓). Define f(A) := τ(A) and f¯
A
(σ) := σ
PA∗
◦ τ .
R1. Let iGLCT 0 A. By Lemma 8.24 we have iGLP 0 A✷↓ and then Lemma 7.23 implies iGLPCa 0
τ(A✷↓), in which τ is as used for the definition of f(A). Since τ is a (.)✷↓-substitution, by
Lemma 7.3 we have iGLPCa 0 (τ(A))✷↓. Then Lemma 8.15 implies that iGLCTCa 0 τ(A), or
in other words iGLCTCa 0 f(A).
R2. Let HA 0 σ
PA∗
(f(A)) for some Σ1-substitution σ. By definition of f(A), we must have iGLCT 0
A, otherwise f(A) := ⊤, which contradicts HA 0 σ
PA∗
(f(A)). Hence f(A) = τ(A) for some
propositional (.)✷↓-substitution τ . By Lemma 3.19 we have HA 0 σ
PA
(τ(A)✷↓). Since iK4+CPa
is included in PL
Σ1
(PA,HA) = iGLPCa (Theorem 7.21), we have HA 0 σPA(τ(A✷↓)). This
implies that HA 0 [f¯
A
(σ)]
PA
(A✷↓) and again by Lemma 3.19 we have HA 0 [f¯
A
(σ)]
PA∗
(A). ✷
Lemma 8.26. For every A ∈ L✷, we have iGLCTP ⊢ A iff GL ⊢ A✷↓.
Proof. We use induction on the proof iGLCTP ⊢ A and show GL ⊢ A✷↓:
• A = ✷B and iGLCT ⊢ B: by Lemma 8.9 we have GL ⊢ B✷ and hence by necessitation
GL ⊢ ✷B✷.
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• iGL ⊢ A: by Lemma 3.7 we have iGL ⊢ A✷↓.
• A = B ∨ ¬B: Then A✷↓ = B✷↓ ∨ ¬B✷↓ which is valid in GL.
• iGLCTP ⊢ B and iGLCTP ⊢ B → A with lower proof length than the one for A: by induction
hypothesis we have GL ⊢ B✷↓ and GL ⊢ B✷↓ → A✷↓, which implies GL ⊢ A✷↓, as desired.
For the other way around, let iGLCTP 0 A. Then by ✷CP we have A✷↓ ↔ A, and then we may
deduce iGLCTP 0 A✷↓. By Theorem 8.5, there exists some quasi-classical perfect Kripke model K
and some boolean interpretation I such that K, α, I 6|= A✷↓. Corollary 3.41 implies K, α, I 6|=c A✷↓,
which by soundness of GL for classical Kripke models, implies GL 0 A✷↓. ✷
Theorem 8.27. iGLCTP = PL(PA∗,PA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA∗,PA) = iGLCTPCa.
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCTP is straightforward and left to the reader. By Theo-
rem 8.14 we have PLΣ1 (PA
∗,PA) = iGLCTPCa. We must show
AC(iGLCTP;PA∗,PA) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLCTPCa;PA
∗,PA).
Given A ∈ L✷, if iGLCTP ⊢ A, define f(A) := ⊤. If iGLCTP 0 A, by Lemma 8.26 we have
GL 0 A✷↓, and hence by Remark 7.4 there exists some propositional (.)✷↓-substitution τ such that
GLCa 0 τ(A✷↓). Define f(A) := τ(A) and f¯A(σ) := σPA∗ ◦ τ .
R1. Let iGLCTP 0 A. By Lemma 8.26 we have GL 0 A✷↓ and then Remark 7.4 implies GLCa 0
τ(A✷↓), in which τ is as used for the definition of f(A). Since τ is a (.)✷↓-substitution, by
Lemma 7.3 we have GLCa 0 (τ(A))✷↓. Then Lemma 8.13 implies that iGLCTPCa 0 τ(A), or in
other words iGLCTPCa 0 f(A).
R2. Let PA 0 σ
PA∗
(f(A)) for some Σ1-substitution σ. By definition of f(A), we must have iGLCTP 0
A, otherwise f(A) := ⊤, which contradicts PA 0 σ
PA∗
(f(A)). Hence f(A) = τ(A) for some
propositional (.)✷↓-substitution τ . By Lemma 3.19 we have PA 0 σ
PA
(τ(A)✷↓). Since iK4+CPa
is included in PL
Σ1
(PA,PA) = GLCa (Theorem 7.1), by Lemma 7.3 we have PA 0 σPA(τ(A✷↓)).
This implies that PA 0 [f¯
A
(σ)]
PA
(A✷↓) and again by Lemma 3.19 we have PA 0 [f¯
A
(σ)]
PA∗
(A).
✷
Lemma 8.28. For every A ∈ L✷, we have iGLCT ⊢ A iff GL ⊢ A
✷.
Proof. One may use induction on the proof iGLCT ⊢ A to show that GL ⊢ A✷. For the other
direction, we reason contrapositively. Let iGLCT 0 A. Since in iGLC we have A ↔ A✷, we have
iGLCT 0 A✷. Hence by Theorem 3.38 there is some perfect quasi-classical model K such that
K, α 1 A✷. Hence by Corollary 3.41 K, α 6|=c A✷. Since |=c is just a classical semantics for the
modal logic GL, by the soundness of GL for finite irreflexive Kripke models [Smo85, Chapter 2.2], we
may deduce GL 0 A✷, as desired. ✷
Lemma 8.29. For every A ∈ L✷, we have iGLCT ⊢ A iff GLCa ⊢ A✷.
Proof. There are two options (atleast) for the proof. First is that one repeat a similar argument of
the proof o for Lemma 8.28. Second proof follows: By Corollary 8.22, iGLCT ⊢ A iff iGLCTPCa ⊢ A✷↑,
and Lemma 8.13 implies iGLCTPCa ⊢ A✷↑ iff GLCa ⊢ (A✷↑)✷↓. Since iK4 ⊢ A✷ ↔ (A✷↑)✷↓, we have
the desired result. ✷
Theorem 8.30. iGLCT = PL(PA∗,PA∗) ≤ PLΣ1 (PA
∗,PA∗) = iGLCT.
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Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCT for general substitutions, i.e. AS(iGLCT;PA∗,PA∗), is
straightforward and left to the reader. By Theorem 8.21 we have PL
Σ1
(PA∗,PA∗) = iGLCT. We
must show
AC(iGLCT;PA∗,PA∗) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLCT;PA
∗,PA∗).
Given A ∈ L✷, if iGLCT ⊢ A, define f(A) := ⊤. If iGLCT 0 A, by Lemma 8.28 we have GL 0 A✷, and
hence by Remark 7.4 there exists some propositional (.)✷↓-substitution τ such that GLCa 0 τ(A✷).
Define f(A) := τ(A) and f¯
A
(σ) := σ
PA∗
◦ τ .
R1. Let iGLCT 0 A. By Lemma 8.28 we have GL 0 A✷ and then Remark 7.4 implies GLCa 0 τ(A✷),
in which τ is as used for the definition of f(A). Since τ is a (.)✷↓-substitution, by Lemma 7.3
we have GLCa 0 τ(A)✷. Then Lemma 8.29 implies that iGLCT 0 τ(A), or in other words
iGLCT 0 f(A).
R2. Let PA∗ 0 σ
PA∗
(f(A)) for some Σ1-substitution σ. By definition of f(A), we must have iGLCT 0
A, otherwise f(A) := ⊤, which contradicts PA∗ 0 σ
PA∗
(f(A)). Hence f(A) = τ(A) for some
propositional (.)✷↓-substitution τ . Then we have PA 0 σ
PA∗
(τ(A))PA and by Lemma 3.18 we
have PA 0 σ
PA
(τ(A)✷). Since iK4 + CPa is included in PLΣ1 (PA,PA) = GLCa (Theorem 7.1),
by Lemma 7.3 we have PA 0 σ
PA
(τ(A✷)). This implies that PA 0 [f¯
A
(σ)]
PA
(A✷) and again by
Lemma 3.18 we have PA 0 ([f¯
A
(σ)]
PA∗
(A))PA. Hence PA∗ 0 [f¯
A
(σ)]
PA∗
(A). ✷
Lemma 8.31. For every A ∈ L✷, we have iGLCTS∗P ⊢ A iff GLS ⊢ A✷↓.
Proof. We use induction on the proof iGLCTS∗P ⊢ A and show GLS ⊢ A✷↓. All cases are similar to
the one for item 3 above, except for
• A = ✷B → B✷: since iK4 ⊢ A✷↓ ↔ (✷B✷ → B✷), we may deduce GLS ⊢ A✷↓.
For the other way around, let iGLCTS∗P 0 A. Then by ✷CP we have A✷↓ ↔ A, and then we may
deduce iGLCTS∗P 0 A✷↓. By Theorem 8.7, there exists some quasi-classical perfect Kripke model K
and some boolean interpretation I such that K, α, I 6|= A✷↓ and K is A✷↓-sound at α. Corollary 3.41
implies K, α, I 6|=c A✷↓, which by soundness of GLS (restricted to sub-formulas of A✷↓) for A✷↓-sound
classical Kripke models, implies GLS 0 A✷↓. ✷
Theorem 8.32. iGLCTS∗P = PL(PA∗,N) ≤ PL
Σ1
(PA∗,N) = iGLCTS∗PCa.
Proof. The arithmetical soundness of iGLCTS∗P is straightforward and left to the reader. By The-
orem 8.18 we have PL
Σ1
(PA∗,N) = iGLCTS∗PCa. We must show
AC(iGLCTS∗P;PA∗,N) ≤f,f¯ ACΣ1 (iGLCTS
∗PCa;PA
∗,N).
Given A ∈ L✷, if iGLCTS∗P ⊢ A, define f(A) := ⊤. If iGLCTS∗P 0 A, by Lemma 8.31 we have
GLS 0 A✷↓, and hence by Remark 7.4 there exists some propositional (.)✷↓-substitution τ such that
GLSCa 0 τ(A✷↓). Define f(A) := τ(A) and f¯A(σ) := σPA∗ ◦ τ .
R1. Let iGLCTS∗P 0 A. By Lemma 8.31 we have GLS 0 A✷↓ and then Remark 7.4 implies
GLSCa 0 τ(A✷↓), in which τ is as used for the definition of f(A). Since τ is a (.)✷↓-substitution,
by Lemma 7.3 we have GLSCa 0 τ(A)✷↓. Then Lemma 8.17 implies that iGLCTS∗PCa 0 τ(A),
or in other words iGLCTS∗PCa 0 f(A).
R2. Let N 6|= σ
PA∗
(f(A)) for some Σ1-substitution σ. By definition of f(A), we must have
iGLCTS∗P 0 A, otherwise f(A) := ⊤, which contradicts N 6|= σ
PA∗
(f(A)). Hence f(A) = τ(A)
for some propositional (.)✷↓-substitution τ . We have N 6|= σ
PA∗
(τ(A)) and by Lemma 3.19we
have N 6|= σ
PA
(τ(A)✷↓). Since iK4 + CPa is included in PLΣ1 (PA,N) = GLSCa (Theorem 7.1),
by Lemma 7.3 we have N 6|= σ
PA
(τ(A✷↓)). This implies that N 6|= [f¯
A
(σ)]
PA
(A✷↓) and again by
Lemma 3.19 we have N
not |= [f¯
A
(σ)]
PA∗
(A). ✷
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Theorem 8.33. iGLCT = PL(PA∗,PA∗) ≤ PL(PA∗,N) = iGLCTS∗P.
Proof. By Theorems 8.30 and 8.32 we have PL(PA∗,PA∗) = iGLCT and PL(PA∗,N) = iGLCTS∗P.
We must show AC(iGLCT;PA∗,PA∗) ≤f,f¯ AC(iGLCTS
∗P;PA∗,N). Given A ∈ L✷, define f(A) = ✷A
and f¯
A
as identity function.
R1. Let iGLCTS∗P ⊢ ✷A. By soundness of iGLCTS∗P = PL(PA∗,N), for every substitution σ
we have N |= σ
PA∗
(✷A) and hence PA∗ ⊢ σ
PA∗
(A). Then by arithmetical completeness of
iGLCT = PL(PA∗,PA∗), we have iGLCT ⊢ A.
R2. Let N 6|= σ
PA∗
(✷A). Then PA∗ 0 σ
PA∗
(A), as desired. ✷
Theorem 8.34. iGLCTP = PL(PA∗,PA) ≤ PL(PA∗,HA) = iGLCT.
Proof. We already have iGLCT = PL(PA∗,HA) and PL(PA∗,PA) = iGLCTP by Theorems 8.25
and 8.27. It is enough here to show that AC(iGLCTP;PA∗,PA) ≤f,f¯ AC(iGLCT;PA
∗,HA). Given
A ∈ L✷, let f(A) := (A)¬↑ and f¯A as identity function.
R1. If iGLCT ⊢ A¬↑ then iGLCTP ⊢ A¬↑, and since we have PEM in iGLCTPCa, we may conclude
iGLCTPCa ⊢ A.
R2. If HA 0 σ
PA∗
(A¬↑), for a substitution σ, then by Lemma 5.18 we have HA 0 (σ
PA∗
(A))¬. Hence
by Lemma 5.15 we have PA 0 σ
PA∗
(A). ✷
9 Conclusion
From Diagram 7, it turns out that the truth Σ1-provability logic of HA, is the hardest provability logic
among the provability logics in Table 6. Closer inspection in the reductions provided in previous
sections, reveals that all propositional reductions, i.e. the functions f , are computable. Hence
by decidability of PL
Σ1
(HA,N) (Corollary 5.6) and Theorem 4.8, we have the decidability of all
provability logics in Table 6:
Corollary 9.1. All provability logics in the Table 6, are decidable.
So far, we have seen many reductions of provability logics. The reductions, helped out to prove
new arithmetical completeness results, have a more general view of all provability logics and intu-
itively say which provability logic is harder. The reader may wonder what other reductions hold,
beyond the transitive closure of the Diagram 7. However it seems more likely that no other reduc-
tions holds, at the moment we can not say anything more than that. This question calls for more
work.
Conjecture 9.2. We conjecture that the following characterizations and reductions holds:
1. iH = PL(HA,HA) ≤ PLΣ1 (HA,HA) = iHσ.
2. iH = PL(HA,HA) ≤ PL(HA,N) = iHSP.
3. iHP = PL(HA,PA) ≤ PL
Σ1
(HA,PA) = iHσP.
4. iHSP = PL(HA,N) ≤ PL
Σ1
(HA,N) = iHσSP.
5. iH∗ = PL(HA∗,HA∗) ≤ PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA∗) = iH∗∗σ .
Moreover, all reductions are computable and hence all provability logics are conjectured to be de-
cidable. In which
• iH is as defined in [Iem01],
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• iH∗ as defined in [AM19],
• iHP is iH plus P,
• iHSP is iH plus S and P,
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Appendices
Name(s) Axiom Scheme Name(s) Axiom Scheme
K ✷(A→ B)→ (✷A→ ✷B) 4 ✷A→ ✷✷A
Lo¨b, L ✷(✷A→ A)→ ✷A CP, C A→ ✷A
S ✷A→ A CPa, Ca
p→ ✷p
for atomic variable p
S∗ ✷A→ A✷ PEM, P A ∨ ¬A
Le ✷(A ∨B)→ ✷(✷. A ∨ ✷. B) Le+ ✷A→ ✷Al
TP, T ✷(A→ B)→ (A ∨ (A→ B)) i All theorems of IPC✷
V A↔ A−
For an axiom scheme A, let A indicates ✷A and A indicates A ∧ A
Table 5: List of axiom schemas
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Theory Axioms Provability Logic(s) Reference
iK4 i,K,4
iGL iK4,L
GL iGL,P PL(PA,PA) [Sol76]
GLCa GL,CPa PLΣ1 (PA,PA) [Vis82]
GLS GL,S PL(PA,N) [Sol76]
GLSCa GLCa,S PLΣ1 (PA,N) [Vis82]
iGLCT iGL,C,T
PL(PA∗,PA∗)
PL
Σ1
(PA∗,PA∗)
[Vis82]
iHσ iGL,V, Le
+ PL
Σ1
(HA,HA) [AM18, VZ19]
iH∗∗σ {A : iHσ ⊢ A
✷} PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA∗) [AM19]
iHσP iHσ,P PLΣ1 (HA,PA) Theorem 5.12
iHσSP iHσ,S,P PLΣ1 (HA,N) Theorem 5.13
iHσSP
∗ {A : iHσSP ⊢ A✷↓} PLΣ1 (HA
∗,N) Theorem 6.1
iHσP
∗ {A : iHσP ⊢ A✷↓} PLΣ1 (HA
∗,PA) Theorem 6.2
iH∗σ {A : iHσ ⊢ A
✷↓} PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA) Theorem 6.3
iGLPCa iGL,P,Ca PLΣ1 (PA,HA) Theorem 7.21
iGLP iGL,P PL(PA,HA) Theorem 7.25
iGLCTPCa iGL,C,T,P,Ca PLΣ1 (PA
∗,PA) Theorem 8.14
iGLCTCa iGL,C,T,Ca PLΣ1 (PA
∗,HA) Theorem 8.16
iGLCTS∗PCa iGL,C,T,S
∗,P,Ca PLΣ1 (PA
∗,N) Theorem 8.18
iGLCTP iGL,C,T,P PL(PA∗,PA) Theorem 8.27
iGLCT iGL,C,T PL(PA∗,HA) Theorem 8.25
iGLCTS∗P iGL,C,T,S∗,P PL(PA∗,N) Theorem 8.32
Table 6: List of all provability logics
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PL(PA,HA) PL(PA,PA) PL(PA,N)
PL(PA∗,HA) PL(PA∗,PA) PL(PA∗,PA∗) PL(PA∗,N)
PL
Σ1
(PA∗,HA) PL
Σ1
(PA∗,PA) PL
Σ1
(PA∗,PA∗) PL
Σ1
(PA∗,N)
PLΣ1 (PA,HA) PLΣ1 (PA,PA) PLΣ1 (PA,N)
PL
Σ1
(HA,PA) PL
Σ1
(HA,HA) PLΣ1 (HA,N)
PL
Σ1
(HA∗,PA) PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA) PL
Σ1
(HA∗,HA∗) PL
Σ1
(HA∗,N)
7.25τ
τ
7.6.2
✷(.)
7.30
τ 7.6.18.25τ 8.27τ
8.33
✷(.)
8.30τ 8.32τ
8.16(.)✷↓
8.19
(.)¬↑
8.14(.)✷↓
8.21
(.)✷↑
8.23
✷(.)
8.18(.)✷↓
7.21
(.)†
✷(.)
7.29
(.)¬↑
7.27
7.22
(.)†
7.11(.)†
(.)¬↑
5.19
✷(.)
5.20
(.)¬↑
6.6
(.)✷↓ 6.2 (.)✷↓ 6.3
✷(.)
6.7
(.)✷↑
6.5
(.)✷↓ 6.1
Diagram 7: Reductions of all provability logics. Arrows indicate a reduction of the completeness of the left hand side to the right one. The
propositional reduction is shown over the arrow line and the theorem number proving this, is shown under arrow line.
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